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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters. They are on three different topics, but they 
are related in the sense that they are concerned with decision-making under risk 
or uncertainty.  
 
In Chapter 1, we use an analogy of walking through fog to explain the problem 
under study. Fog has the property that vision becomes less and less clear the 
further ahead that you try to look, and after a certain distance you simply cannot 
see anything. In the experiment, the subject’s aim is to travel across the foggy and 
hilly terrain with minimum energy expenditure. This problem, although set in a 
non-economic context, obviously has relevance to many economic problems. 
 
Chapter 2 is about elicitation methods for discovering subjects’ risk preferences. 
The concern of the experiment is to compare four different methods used for 
eliciting the level of risk aversion. We carried out an experiment in four parts, 
corresponding to the four different methods and our methodology involves fitting 
four different preference functionals. Our results show that the inferred level of 
risk aversion is more sensitive to the elicitation method than to the assumed-true 
preference functional. Experimenters should worry most about context. 
 
Chapter 3 is about the interrelationship of decisions which come in a series. The 
validity of Random Lottery Incentive mechanism has been investigated in two 
main ways: first, just two decision problems, and second, many problems. This 
chapter combines and extends these two ways by investigating a cognitively 
less-demanding hypothesis than that all previous decisions are taken into account, 
but allows for an indirect effect of previous decisions on current ones. 
Reassuringly we find little effect and hence our results complement the previous 
evidence indicating that the Random Lottery Incentive mechanism is robust and 
can safely be used.  
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Chapter 1. Walking through the Fog
1
 
1.1 Introduction 
Consider a typical dynamic problem - that of planning the optimal lifetime 
path of consumption conditional on income. If future incomes are certain 
the optimising process is conceptually straightforward (though it may be 
technically complex). If the future incomes are uncertain, there are two 
paths that can be followed. If future incomes are risky, and probability 
distributions are specified for incomes at each date, then the 
Decision-Maker (DM) can optimise by maximising the expected utility2 of 
consumption over the cycle; the DM could solve the problem by backward 
induction. If future incomes are ambiguous, but can be characterised in 
some way (by sets of possible probabilities for example) then it could be 
assumed that one of the relatively new preference functionals for 
decision-making under ambiguity would be employed; once again 
backward induction could be used.  
 
Note that all these methods assume that the DM either knows the 
distributions of future incomes or is prepared to make some assumptions 
about them. Now consider a situation where the DM is told nothing about 
incomes after a certain point in the future. In principle it could be modelled 
by assuming that the DM translates this information into some 
                                                 
1 This chapter is a joint work with John Hey, and financially supported by Daniela Di Cagno 
(LUISS, Rome, Italy). 
2 Or some other objective if the preferences are not Expected Utility. 
2 
 
distributions. But it depends on how ‘being told nothing’ is interpreted. 
One way of interpreting this is as saying that the distribution of such 
incomes is unbounded. But taking expectations in such a case may lead to 
an expected utility, under all actions, of minus or plus infinity. In such a 
case, attempts to optimise over the complete future would be impossible. 
An alternative story would be that the DM could be modelled as looking 
only a short way forward – perhaps just as far as he or she can ‘see’ – and 
rolling this short horizon forwards as time passes. Clearly this does not use 
backward induction from the true horizon and cannot be considered the 
optimal strategy – either objectively or subjectively so. 
 
In such a situation, an individual whom we would call rational in some 
sense will still aim to work out a strategy to maximise his or her utility. 
Here in this chapter we are interested in what they do – in a problem 
where there is ‘no’ information sufficiently ‘far away’.  
 
In this chapter, we investigate, in a situation where full information is not 
available, human decision-making. We cannot observe human behaviour 
directly in field, mainly because we cannot control the environment while 
trying to do so might raise ethical issues, as well as implying time problems. 
Thus, we have designed a laboratory experiment which retains the nature 
of this problem, and which can be finished within a reasonable time-slot 
without any ethical issues. 
 
3 
 
Our experiment also incorporates a further important extension, one in 
which backward induction may not only be computationally difficult or not 
lead to a solution, but one in which ‘backwards’ is not defined. The 
economic problem mentioned above is set in a one-dimensional (with the 
one dimension being time) world, in which ‘backwards’ is clearly defined, 
with the decision-maker starting in some time period t1 and stopping in 
time period t2. Consider however a two-dimensional problem. Label the 
two dimensions x and y. Suppose the decision-maker starts at some point 
in this 2-dimensional world (x1,y1) and the problem is to get to some other 
point (x2,y2) with some objective in mind. Passing through points on the 
way costs money (which is defined by the nature of the problem) and the 
objective is to get to the destination with the minimum expenditure. Now 
clearly if (x1,y1) and (x2,y2) do not share the same x values or the same y 
values (and even if they do) there is no obvious way ‘backwards’ from (x2,y2) 
to (x1,y1). Hence finding the optimal way from the start to the destination is 
not a backward induction problem – we shall explain in more detail later.  
 
An example of such a problem is one where the decision-maker is a firm 
and wants to move from some initial factor combination to a new one, but 
can only do this in steps of a given size at any one time. Production has to 
occur in the meantime, and certain factor combinations are less efficient 
than others. There are costs to changing the factor inputs. This problem 
cannot be solved by backward induction, simply because there is no 
obvious meaning to the word ‘backward’. It may be better to pass through 
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an intermediate stage of production where one or both of the factor inputs 
are outside the range from the initial factor combination to the final one, 
than go ‘directly to the final one. 
 
The experiment we have designed is called “Walking through the Fog”. In 
the experiment, the subject is asked to take a series of decisions. These 
decisions are not independent. A previous decision determines the option 
set for the next decision. His or her payoff will be shown at the end of the 
experiment, and is dependent on all the decisions that he or her has made. 
More specifically, in the experiment the subject has to travel across a map 
and reach a destination. She or he consumes energy while travelling. And 
the expenditure of energy is dependent on how hilly is the route that she 
or he has chosen. His or her aim is to reach the destination with the least 
energy expenditure. Or in other words, his or her aim is to find a flattest 
route from current position to the destination. She or he can find such a 
route if she or he can see the whole map clearly. However, to make the 
experiment interesting and relevant to the problem that we outlined, the 
terrain is foggy. The subject can vaguely see the terrain around him or her. 
But if the distance is too far, due to the fog, she or he can see nothing. 
Although this experiment is based in a non-economic context, it can be 
easily applied to many economic problems. We can gather the data which 
share the same nature with the economic problem we are interested in. 
 
There is a good example in industrial organisation. Suppose a supermarket 
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provides discount on a specific day each week to attract customers. Thus, 
on that day the profit brought by big demand covers the loss from discount. 
However, if the supermarket provides discount on more than one day in a 
week, the loss cannot be covered by the profit. And if it does not provide 
discount at all, it will suffer a loss since the customers might be attracted 
by competitors. Given the background, the supermarket faces a 
decision-making problem every working day – to discount, or not to 
discount?  
 
In order to make a decision which maximises profit, the supermarket has to 
consider about the dimension of time. Discount today or postpone it? How 
its competitors will react to this decision in the future? Will such reactions 
enhance or weaken its profit in the future? The supermarket also has to 
consider about the dimension of space. What other events happen in the 
same time while it is making decision? For example, is its competitors 
providing discount now? Is there any important event just in the market?  
 
The supermarket has to make a decision every working day with 
considering both of the two dimensions. Since it cannot predict the future, 
it may have some vague ideas about the near coming days, but know very 
little if the future is too far. For example, suppose now is Monday, the 
supermarket might have some expectation about Tuesday, and some 
vague information about Wednesday. However, it might have little 
prediction about Sunday. 
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In section 2, the design of the experiment is introduced. There we also talk 
about the implementation of the experiment. In section 3, we discuss the 
algorithm to find the optimal route without fog. Data from the experiment 
is analysed in section 4. We build several strategies and to see which one 
fits the subjects best. In section 5, we conclude, and discuss our plan of 
future research.  
 
1.2 The Experiment 
1.2.1 Introduction 
With full information, it is possible for a person to work out an optimal 
strategy to maximise his or her utility in a dynamic decision-making 
problem. Here “full information” means accurate information about the 
future, or an appropriate distribution of the possible outcomes in the 
future. However, in the real world, not only the accurate information, but 
also the distribution of the possible outcomes is unavailable in many 
situations. Or even if the distribution is obtained, with huge variance, it is 
uninformative. For example, a possible value is equally likely to be between 
zero and infinity. We cannot have any useful inference from such 
information, since the expected value of that outcome is infinite.  
 
Nevertheless, rational people still try to maximise their utility or payoff by 
some strategy. Indeed we found from our experiment that some of them 
have achieved an outcome which is not too far from the optimal strategy 
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with full information. 
 
We are interested in the question as to whether, in the situation without 
full information, what people do to try and maximise their utility or payoff. 
We are curious about what kind of strategies they employ, and what kind 
of outcomes these strategies lead to. The seemingly direct way of getting 
data for this topic is observing people making decisions in the field. But it is 
unrealistic. First, in field, some series of dynamic decision-making can run 
through the whole life span. It is impossible to observe a person’s whole 
life closely and record every decision made by him or her for examination. 
Secondly, even if some kind of series of decisions can be observed in a 
relatively short time span, a person may not want to reveal all the 
decisions made, due to ethical issues or other reasons. Thirdly, even if a 
person would like to reveal all his or her decisions in a specific time span, 
some important decisions which affect the outcome heavily may still be 
excluded unwittingly. For example, a small thing ten years ago might be a 
vital reason for today’s outcome; but it may have been ignored not only 
because of the passage of time but also because how small it is. 
 
We turn to a laboratory experiment since it is impossible to gather the data 
in the field for our research question. A laboratory experiment has several 
advantages. First, the experiment can be run in about one hour. A group of 
subjects can do the experiment simultaneously. Thus we can gather a 
considerable amount of data in a relatively short time span. This is much 
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more efficient than gathering data in field. Second, the experiment can be 
designed in a specific context without any ethical issues or problems of 
personal privacy. Third, the experiment can be designed to rule out all 
outside interference, so that the outcome of the experiment is only 
affected by the decisions made in the experiment.    
 
In order to build a one-to-one mapping from the field topic to a laboratory 
experiment, we construct a story which is a metaphor of the topic. In the 
story, a person is travelling across hilly countryside. She or he consumes 
energy while moving uphill or downhill. Although the absolute difference is 
the same, uphill and downhill consume different amount of energy. She or 
he has an incentive to reach the destination with the minimum energy 
expenditure. In other words, she or he wants to follow a cheapest/optimal 
route to reach the destination. If she or he can see the whole terrain clearly, 
it is possible for him or her to work out an optimal route. Unfortunately, 
the terrain is foggy. She or he can only have some vague information of the 
terrain around. And if the distance is too far, she or he can see nothing at 
all. We would like to observe, under such a situation, people’s behaviour of 
trying to identify the optimal route. 
 
The experiment was implemented in Visual Studio. We use maps from the 
real world for our experiment. There are four journeys each with a 
different map in a session. The payoff for each journey is the endowment 
minus the total energy expenditure of that journey. Thus, in order to 
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maximise his or her payoff, a rational subject’s aim is to find the optimal 
route with the least energy expenditure. To mimic the fog, the subject 
cannot see the terrain of the map freely. The maps are divided into squares. 
Each square contains a number which denotes the height of that area. The 
subject can see the height of the square which shares a boundary (one 
square away) with his or her current square. However, if the square is two 
square-away from the current square, she or he can only see a range. For 
the squares which are three squares away from the current square, the 
range is even wider. For the further squares, the subject can see nothing.  
 
There are four treatments in the experiment. Each subject only experiences 
one treatment. Each treatment contains four journeys with four different 
maps. But the four maps are the same four across treatments. The 
difference between treatments is the distance the subject can see and the 
width of the ranges. Table 1.1 provides a summary. If the range is denoted 
as ∞ it means that in that treatment the subject can see nothing at that 
distance. 
Table 1.1: Ranges across Treatments 
 
In the experiment, once the destination of a journey is reached, the subject 
can start the next journey. The experiment ends when all the four journeys 
Ranges Across Treatments 
Treatment One square away Two squares away Three squares away 
1 0 20 50 
2 0 20 ∞ 
3 0 40 100 
4 0 40 ∞ 
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are finished. Then one of the four payoffs is randomly selected for 
determining the payoff to the subject. The payoff can never be negative. If 
the energy expenditure exceeds the endowment, the payoff is zero. The 
rest of this section contains details of the experiment. 
 
1.2.2 The Background Story 
In the story, the subject is supposed to be walking through countryside. His 
or her aim is to reach a specific destination with energy expenditure as low 
as possible. Unfortunately, the terrain is hilly. Thus, the subject may have 
to move uphill or downhill. Such activities cause energy expenditure. To 
make matters worse, the terrain is foggy. So the subject cannot directly see 
and plan a flattest route with the least energy expenditure from his or her 
current position to the destination. 
 
Due to the thick fog, the subject does not have even a rough idea about 
how the terrain between his or her current position and what the 
destination looks like. She or he can only vaguely see the terrain around 
him or her. If the distance is too far, she or he cannot see anything, 
because the fog is so thick. 
 
Given the conditions above, regardless of energy expenditure, reaching the 
destination itself looks like an impossible mission. But luckily, the subject 
has several items of equipment for helping. First, she or he has a map 
without contours. So she or he knows on the map where his or her starting 
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point is and where the destination is. Secondly, she or he has a compass. 
So she or he knows to which direction the destination is. Combining these 
two tools, she or he can always check where his or her current position is, 
and how far away the destination is from the current position, without 
knowing the terrain between the two points. 
 
Before the journey, the subject knows that, as a human-being, she or he 
has to spend energy while moving. To simplify, only moving uphill or 
downhill consumes energy. Moving through a flat route does not consume 
any energy.  And as is the case, she or he spends more energy moving 
uphill than moving downhill. Given that she or he cannot see the terrain 
around clearly, and even cannot see anything if the distance is too far, she 
or he has to find an optimal route with the least energy expenditure 
possible to reach the destination. As we have described before, in this way, 
the subject can attempt to maximise his or her utility/payoff. 
 
The subject has to fulfil an aim, which involves a lot of decision making. In 
our story, walking from the start position to the destination with the least 
energy expenditure is the aim. "With the least energy" implies "maximise 
utility", since using energy means negative experience. 
 
The thick fog simulates the condition that, in real world, people cannot 
predict the future. She or he only has some vague information of the near 
future. In the experiment, the subject cannot see the terrain between his 
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or her current position and the destination. Thus she or he cannot directly 
pick the flattest route with the least energy expenditure. However, in real 
world, people have to make series of decisions under this condition. And in 
the experiment, the subject has to make series of decisions of where to 
move to at every step.  
 
As a result, the story is an abstraction of economic problem. By observing 
and analysing subjects’ behaviour in the story, we can infer something 
about their behaviour in real world. Our experiment is based on such a 
story. 
 
1.2.3 Experiment Design 
1.2.3.1 Programming 
1.2.3.1.1 Moving Rules 
The experimental interface is programmed in Visual Studio. In the 
experiment, there are four different maps for travelling. These maps are 
modified from different parts of the real world, though the subjects do not 
know which parts they are. The map has been divided into 200 by 200 
squares. Every square contains a non-negative integer which denotes the 
height of that square. 
 
When the subject moves from one square to another, she or he spends 
energy. As we explained in the story, moving up uses more energy than 
moving down. More precisely, moving up is using energy equal to twice the 
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difference between the heights of the two squares, while moving down is 
using energy equal to the difference between the heights of the two 
squares.  
 
For example, if the height of the subject's current square is 50, and the 
height of the square to which the subject has decided to move is 55, then 
the subject is moving up, since 50 is smaller than 55. His or her energy 
expenditure is 10, which is twice the difference between the heights of the 
two squares. 
 
If the height of the subject's current square is 55, and the height of the 
square to which the subject has decided to move is 50, then the subject is 
moving down, since 55 is larger than 50. His or her energy expenditure is 5, 
which is the difference between the heights of the two squares. 
 
1.2.3.1.2 Decision Making 
In the experiment, the subject's aim is to move from the start position to 
the destination with the least energy expenditure. Thus, for each journey, 
the subject has to decide which square to move to at every step. The four 
journeys are completely independent. Energy expenditure of one journey 
does not affect the others. 
 
The subject starts from the centre square which is in the 101st row and 
101st column. The square is shown in the centre of the screen. And she or 
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he has to move between squares till they reach the destination. While 
travelling across the map, the subject can only move to the squares which 
share a boundary with his or her current square. In other words, she or he 
can only move to the adjacent square up, down, left or right relative to the 
current square. 
 
Figure 1.1 is an illustration of the moving rule. At the beginning of each 
journey, the subject has to click the square with "Start" on it. Then she or 
he has four options, up, down, left, and right. That is, at this step, she or he 
can only move to the four squares with "*" on them. She or he has to 
decide which one to move to. 
 
Figure 1.1: An Example for the Rule of Moving 
 
From Figure 1.1, there is no useful information for helping to make decision. 
However, in the experiment, once the subject clicks the "Start" button, she 
or he will have some information about the true heights of nearby squares. 
Figure 1.2 is an example. 
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In Figure 1.2, the subject's current position is in the centre of the picture. It 
is denoted by a dark-grey square. And the subject can see that its height is 
370. And the subject can see three-squares away from his or her current 
position. 
 
The four green squares in Figure 1.2 are squares to which the subject can 
move. They are disabled until ten seconds have elapsed. The subject is 
forced to wait at least ten seconds before they can go to the next step. 
Such a design is to restrict the subject from just fast clicking without 
thinking. While green, the squares are selectable. And the subject can 
make a decision for this step. She or he can find the exact height of the 
four squares. 
 
She or he might want to consider a bit further. Unfortunately, she or he 
cannot get the exact height of those squares which are not adjacent to his 
or her current position. But she or he still has some vague information 
about the range of the true value. 
 
From Figure 1.2, if a square is two squares away from current position, the 
subject can see a range which contains the true height of that square. The 
interval of the range is 20. More precisely, in this example the range 
contains 20 integers. For example, if the range is 1-20, it contains 20 
integers (all heights are given to the nearest integer). The true height of the 
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square is one of the 20 integers all with the same probability. Subjects are 
told this. 
 
Figure 1.2: A Screenshot for the Experiment Interface in Treatment 1 
 
If a square is three squares away from current position, the interval of the 
range in this example is 50, since the fog is increasing as the distance is 
increasing. Further, in this current example, if a square is more than three 
squares away from the current position, the subject is told nothing about 
its height; the distance is too far. 
 
We should note that in the experiment, information is not always like this; 
it depends upon the treatment. There were four of them. Figure 1.2 is from 
treatment one. In treatment one, subject can see three squares away, with 
intervals of width zero, 20, and 50. In treatment two, subject can see only 
two squares away, with intervals of width zero and 20. In treatment three, 
subject can see three squares away, with intervals of width zero, 40, and 
100. And in treatment four, subject can see only two squares away, with 
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intervals of width zero and 40. 
 
Thus, the four treatments differ with information quality and quantity. 
Table 1.2 illustrates. Treatment one has information with both higher 
quality and higher quantity. And treatment four has information with both 
lower quality and lower quantity. Or in other words, treatment four is 
much foggier than treatment one. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Information Quantity and Quality across Treatments 
 
1.2.3.1.3 Interface 
Figure 1.3 is the screen display at the beginning of a journey. The main 
body is the map. Due to space limitations, subjects are only shown a part of 
the map. Here it is an 11 by 11 matrix. As the subject moves across the 
map, the boundaries roll. The subject always stays in the centre of the 
matrix. In other words, if the subject is moving towards the destination, 
actually it is the destination moving towards to him or her. 
  
Quality 
High Low 
Quantity 
High T1 T3 
Low T2 T4 
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Figure 1.3: A Screenshot of the Interface before Starting 
 
On the top left of the screen, it shows the number of the current journey. 
There are four journeys with different maps in a session of the experiment. 
The four maps are the same four across treatments. 
 
At the upper-right corner, there is a timer. After one click, the subject has 
to wait 10 seconds to make the next click. If she or he clicks before the 
timer has reached zero, nothing happens.  
 
Below the countdown, there is a box showing how much energy 
expenditure has been spent on this journey. Energy expenditure is 
independent from journey to journey. Once a new journey starts, the box 
shows energy expenditure from zero. 
 
Under the expenditure box, there is the endowment-remaining box. In 
each session, endowments vary from journey to journey (because the 
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journeys vary in difficulty). Across the four treatments, the four 
endowments are the same. From journey one to journey four the 
endowments are £21.00, £25.50, £25.50, and £36.00. The ‘endowment 
remaining’ is the endowment minus the energy expenditure, with an 
exchange rate of one point of energy expenditure equalling 1.5 pence3; the 
endowment remaining cannot be negative - if the energy expenditure 
converted to pounds exceeds the endowment, the endowment remaining 
will stay zero. 
 
At the end of each journey, the endowment remaining is the payoff of this 
journey. 
 
Figure 1.4: A Screenshot of the Interface after Starting 
 
Figure 1.4 is an example of an ongoing journey in treatment one. On the 
map, the subject can see three squares away with intervals zero, 20, and 50. 
                                                 
3 We did the experiment twice. For the one in May 2013, the exchange rate of one point of energy 
expenditure equalling 1 penny. For the one in Nov 2013, the exchange rate of one point of energy 
expenditure equalling 1.5 pence.  
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Once she or he knows the height of a specific square, the height stays on 
that square and will not be replaced by vague information. 
 
The current position is always in the centre of the screen. The adjacent 
squares are red because the countdown has not reached zero. Thus the 
subject cannot make a decision. There are still five seconds to elapse. Once 
the countdown reaches zero, the four squares turn to green and clickable. 
 
The expenditure box shows that, up to now, the subject has spent 56 
points of energy, which equals 84 pence, or £0.84. 
 
Since the initial endowment for journey one is £21. The endowment left is 
£21 minus £0.84, which is £20.16. It is shown in the endowment-remaining 
box. 
 
The destination is not shown on the map of Figure 1.4, since it is too far 
away from the current position and out of the 11 by 11 matrix. However, 
the subject can always check how far away and in which direction the 
destination is. This information is given below the expenditure-remaining 
box; it shows that the destination is 12 squares up from and 15 squares to 
the right of the current position.  
 
In Figure 1.5, the destination square has appeared on the map, since now 
the current position is close enough to the destination. The current 
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position is still in the centre of the map. So actually, it is the destination 
moving towards the subject, who is always staying in the centre of the 
map. 
 
Once the destination square is reached, the journey is finished. A message 
box shows with the payoff of this journey. Then the subject can click a 
"Start" button to enter the next journey. 
 
Once journey four is finished, the whole experiment is finished. The screen 
turns out to one like Figure 1.6. The payoff of each of the four journeys are 
shown. One of them is randomly selected to be constitute the payoff for 
the experiment as a whole. 
 
 
Figure 1.5: A Screenshot for a Nearly Ending Journey 
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Figure 1.6: A Screenshot for the Payoff Summary after the Experiment 
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1.2.3.2 Data for the maps 
The maps of the four journeys come from different parts of the real world. 
Real data is used instead of randomly-generated data.  
 
The experiment is a metaphor of a series of decision making. In the real 
world, events in a sequence have some kind of relationship between each 
other. They are not completely independent. Thus, if we use data which is 
randomly generated by computer and the elements of which are 
completely independent of each other, it would become a bad metaphor. 
For example, there might be a peak next to an abyss. But this case seldom 
occurs in the real world.  
 
We considered adding some correlations on randomly-generated data. 
However, it is impossible, because this process will cause bias. We tried to 
put some parameters which relate to adjacent elements while generating a 
new element. However, a computer cannot generate the whole map 
simultaneously. If there is an order of data generating, there is a bias. Since 
new elements always depend on the existing adjacent elements. And it is a 
one-direction relationship between elements.  
 
Thus we decided to use real data to build the map. There is innate 
correlation of geographic elements. And such correlation is bidirectional 
rather than depending on a specific direction. 
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We get the data from CGIAR CSI (Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research - Consortium for Spatial Information). The name and 
version of the database is SRTM (the NASA Shuttle Radar Topographic 
Mission) 90m Digital Elevation Database v4.1. And the pictures of the four 
maps are shown in Figure 1.7. From left to right and from top to bottom, 
they are journeys one, two, three, and four. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.7: The Four Maps used in the Experiment 
 
We deliberately choose maps which are quite hilly. The size of a map is five 
degrees of latitude by five degrees of longitude. Each map is divided into 
6000 by 6000 squares. The width and length of each square is 
approximately 90 metres. 
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However, the 6000 by 6000 matrix is too large to our experiment. First, 
limited by time, subject can only go through a very small part of the map. 
Thus the large matrix is a waste and it is unnecessary. Secondly, to run a 
6000 by 6000 matrix is a computational burden for computers.  
 
In order to modify the data for our experiment, we did some aggregation. 
We treat the 6000 by 6000 matrix as a 200 by 200 matrix with each 
element is a 30 by 30 matrix. Then we calculate the average value of the 30 
by 30 matrix. In this way, we reduce the large matrix to a 200 by 200 matrix 
with each element of an integer. This method simplifies the map. And the 
interrelationship of each element is retained. 
 
In the experiment, we did not tell the subject which parts of the world the 
maps are. Thus we avoid providing them any hints of the journey.  
 
1.2.4 Experiment Implementation 
In the experiment there were four sessions each with four different 
treatments. There were 12 subjects in each session; each session lasted 
about one hour, though subjects were allowed to go at their own speed. 
 
Since the experiment is an individual experiment, subjects were not 
allowed to communicate with others. The results were anonymous and 
kept as private information. 
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Before subjects entered the laboratory, they were asked to randomly draw 
a piece of paper which contained a number. This number was their seat 
number. In this way, subjects were randomly seated. Every seat was 
equipped with a computer, a set of Instructions (see the Appendix), and a 
pen. 
 
After all subjects had been seated, the experimenter read the instruments 
from the front of the lab. Then the subjects were given five minutes to read 
the instructions and finish a set of control questions. During this period, if 
they had any question they could ask the experimenter; the experimenter 
would come and answer it privately. The experimenter also checked the 
answers of the control questions, in order to make sure that every subject 
had understood instructions.  
 
Once all the subjects finished the control questions and had been checked 
by the experimenter, the experiment started. During the experiment, 
subjects were not allowed to communicate with each other. If they had any 
questions, they were free to ask the experimenter privately. 
 
When the subject finished the experiment, she or he let the experimenter 
know. The experimenter approached him or her and brought an opaque 
bag. There were four balls in the bag numbered from 1 to 4. The subject 
randomly drew a ball from the bag, and she or he was paid according to 
the number on the ball. For example, if she or he drew a ball with number 
27 
 
three, she or he was paid according to his or her payoff on journey three. In 
addition, each subject received a show-up fee of £2.5. 
 
1.3 Optimal Route (without Fog)  
1.3.1 Introduction 
Without fog full information about the map can be obtained. However, the 
optimal route in this particular problem cannot be calculated by backward 
induction; first, because there is no obvious ‘backwards’ in this 
two-dimensional problem, and second because it is not necessarily the 
case that the optimal move at any stage is in a direction directly towards 
the destination. It might be better to go round some high peak rather than 
go through it.  
 
In principle, the optimal route from the starting square to the destination 
can be found. It can be separated into two parts. First, the minimum 
energy expenditure from the starting square to the destination can be 
identified. Second, based on the minimum expenditure, the optimal route 
can be identified. The most difficult task is the first step. Since the matrix is 
big and there are huge numbers of possible routes, we cannot calculate the 
minimum expenditure manually. Unfortunately, in the context of our 
experiment, there is no existing algorithm to identify the minimum energy 
expenditure. However, we can borrow the idea from some of the 
algorithms of computer science. Then an algorithm can be built based on 
them to identify our optimal route. 
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In computer science, there is a general algorithm for “finding the shortest 
path”. This was constructed by Dijkstra (1959). At a first glance, “finding 
the shortest path” has no relation with our problem, since we are “finding 
the optimal route with the least energy expenditure”. However, these two 
problems are essentially similar. 
 
In our context, we are looking for a route for which the energy expenditure 
is the least. The total energy expenditure is calculated by aggregating the 
energy expenditure between each two neighbouring squares on the route. 
Abstractly, we can treat each square as a node, and the energy expenditure 
is a value v related to the two neighbouring nodes. For finding an optimal 
route, it is for identifying a route with the minimum sum of v among all 
possible routes from the initial node to the destination node. It can be 
expressed as follows. 
Energy Expenditure of Optimal Route = Min(∑ vi
n−1
i=1
) (1.1) 
On a route from the starting square to the destination, there are n squares4 
in total. The energy expenditure is calculated from the starting square 
towards the destination. Once the energy expenditure of moving from one 
square to the other has been calculated, both the two squares are marked 
as visited. 𝑣𝑖  is the energy expenditure of moving from one square to its 
unvisited neighbour square. Especially, 𝑣1 is the energy expenditure of 
                                                 
4
 Here the number n includes the starting square and the destination. 
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moving from the starting square to one of its neighbour square, and 𝑣𝑛−1 
is the energy expenditure of moving to the destination from one of its 
neighbour square.  
 
In computer science, for finding the shortest path, it is actually identifying a 
route following which the distance between the initial node and the end 
node is minimised. The distance is the sum of the distance between each 
the two neighbour nodes on the route. It can be exhibited as follows. 
Distance of Shortest Path = Min(∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
) (1.2) 
On a route from the initial node to the end node, denote by n the total 
number of nodes passed through. The distance is calculated from the initial 
node towards the end node. Once the distance between two nodes has 
been calculated, both the two nodes are marked as visited. Denote by 𝑣𝑖  
the distance between one node and its unvisited neighbour node. In 
particular, 𝑣1 is the distance between the initial node and one of its 
neighbour nodes, and 𝑣𝑛−1 is the distance between one of the neighbour 
nodes of the end node and the end node itself. 
 
Although the problem of finding the shortest path looks different from the 
problem of identifying the optimal route, they are essentially similar. From 
equation (1.1) and equation (1.2), it is easy to see that the difference 
between the two problems is the definition of 𝑣𝑖. Thus, we can borrow 
some ideas from the algorithm of finding the shortest path for solving our 
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problem. 
 
1.3.2 Review of Algorithms for Finding the Shortest Path 
1.3.2.1 Dijkstra’s Algorithm 
Dijkstra (1959) has constructed an algorithm for finding the shortest route 
in computer science. It can be decomposed into several steps. First, all the 
nodes except the initial node are marked as unvisited. The tentative 
distances from the initial node to each of them are signed as infinite. 
Second, the initial node is marked as the current node, with the tentative 
distance from itself as 0. Third, if a node is marked as the current node, the 
new tentative distance for each of its unvisited neighbour nodes is 
calculated by the tentative distance of the current node adding the 
distance between the current node and that node.  The old tentative 
distance assigned on that node is replaced by the new one if and only if the 
new tentative distance is smaller. Fourth, as soon as all the neighbour 
nodes of the current node are considered, the current node is marked as 
visited. A visited node is never visited again. Fifth, if the destination is 
marked as the current node or the smallest tentative distance among all 
unvisited node is equal to infinity, the algorithm is finished. In the second 
case, there is no connection between the current node and any of its 
unvisited neighbour nodes. Sixth, the unvisited node with the smallest 
tentative distance is marked as the current node. The third step is repeated 
till the destination is marked as visited. 
 
31 
 
Here is an example to illustrate Dijkstra’s Algorithm. In Figure 1.8, each 
circle denotes a node, and each line denotes the path between two nodes. 
The number along with each line denotes the distance between the two 
connected nodes. 𝑛1 is the initial node and 𝑛6 is the destination. 
 
Figure 1.9 shows the map after the second step of Dijkstra’s Algorithm. All 
the numbers or signs inside the brackets denote the tentative distance 
from the initial node to that node. The initial node, 𝑛1, is marked as the 
current step, with the distance to itself as 0. All the other nodes are 
marked as unvisited, with the tentative distance as infinite. 
 
Figure 1.10 shows the map after the third step of Dijkstra’s Algorithm for 
the first round. Since 𝑛1 is the current node, its neighbour nodes are 𝑛2, 
𝑛3, and 𝑛4. The new tentative distance from the initial node to 𝑛2 equals 
the tentative distance assigned to 𝑛1 adding the distance between 𝑛1 
and 𝑛2. The result is 15, which is smaller than the tentative distance 
assigned on 𝑛2. Thus for 𝑛2 the old tentative distance ∞ is replaced by 
the new tentative distance 15. In the same way, the tentative distances 
assigned on 𝑛3 and 𝑛4 can be replaced by 10 and 6 respectively. Since all 
the neighbour nodes of 𝑛1 have been considered, 𝑛1 is marked as visited. 
And since neither of the two conditions in the fifth step is satisfied, the 
algorithm goes on. According to the sixth step, the node 𝑛4 with the 
smallest tentative distance among all the unvisited nodes is marked as the 
current node. The algorithm is not finished, thus we go back to the third 
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step. 
 
Figure 1.8: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (Initial) 
 
 
Figure 1.9: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (After the Second Step) 
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Figure 1.11 shows the map after the third step of Dijkstra’s Algorithm for 
the second round. 𝑛4 is marked as the current node, and its unvisited 
neighbour nodes are 𝑛3 and 𝑛6. The new tentative distance for 𝑛3 is the 
sum of the tentative distance assigned to 𝑛4 and the distance between 
𝑛4 and 𝑛3. It is 19, and it is greater than the old tentative distance 
assigned to 𝑛3. Thus, the old tentative distance is not replaced by the new 
one. But for 𝑛6, the old tentative distance ∞ is replaced by the new one, 
which is 23. And then, since there is no more unconsidered neighbour 
nodes of the current node, 𝑛4 is marked as visited. Neither of the two 
conditions in the fifth step is satisfied, and the algorithm goes on. 
According to the sixth step, 𝑛3 is marked as the new current node. 
 
Figure 1.10: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (After the Third Step - 1) 
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Figure 1.11: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (After the Third Step - 2) 
 
Figure 1.12 shows the map after the third step of Dijkstra’s Algorithm for 
the third round. 𝑛3 is the current node with assigned tentative distance 
10. Its unvisited neighbour nodes are 𝑛2  and 𝑛5 . The new tentative 
distance for 𝑛2  is the tentative distance of 𝑛3  adding the distance 
between 𝑛3 and 𝑛5, which is 11. It is smaller than the old tentative 
distance of 𝑛2. Thus, the tentative distance of 𝑛2 is replaced by 11. And 
in the same way, the tentative distance of 𝑛5 is replaced by 13. Since both 
of the unvisited neighbour nodes of 𝑛3  are visited, 𝑛3  is marked as 
visited. Neither of the two conditions in the fifth step is satisfied, and the 
algorithm goes on. According to the sixth step, 𝑛2 is marked as the new 
current node. 
  
𝑛3(10) 
𝑛2(15) 
 𝑛6(23) 
 𝑛5(∞) 
 𝑛4(6)  𝑛1(0) 
V 
151
8 
1 
3 
10 
6 
5 
17 
9 
35 
 
 
Figure 1.12: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (After the Third Step - 3) 
 
Figure 1.13 shows the map after the third step of Dijkstra’s Algorithm for 
the fourth round. 𝑛2  is marked as the current node with tentative 
distance 11. The only unvisited neighbour node of it is 𝑛5, with tentative 
distance 13. The new tentative distance of 𝑛5 is the sum of the tentative 
distance of 𝑛2 and the distance between 𝑛2 and 𝑛5. The result is 19 and 
it is greater than 13. Thus, the tentative distance of 𝑛5 is not replaced by 
the new one. Since there are no unconsidered neighbour nodes, 𝑛2 is 
marked as visited. Neither of the two conditions in the fifth step are 
satisfied, and the algorithm goes on. According to the sixth step, 𝑛5 is 
marked as the new current node. 
 
Figure 1.14 shows the map after the third step of Dijkstra’s Algorithm for 
the fifth round. 𝑛5 is the current node, of which the tentative distance is 
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13. The only unvisited neighbour node of it is 𝑛6, with tentative distance 
23. Since the distance between 𝑛5  and 𝑛6  is 5, the new tentative 
distance for 𝑛6 is 18. It is smaller than 18. Thus the old tentative distance 
of 𝑛6 is replaced. Since there are no unvisited neighbour nodes other than 
𝑛6, 𝑛5 is marked as visited. And 𝑛6 is the current node.  
 
Since 𝑛6 is the destination and is also the current node, the first condition 
in the fifth step is satisfied. The algorithm is finished. We can easily check 
the steps and find the shortest path from the initial node to the destination. 
It is shown in figure 1.15. And the path is 𝑛1-𝑛3-𝑛5-𝑛6. 
 
Figure 1.13: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (After the Third Step - 4) 
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Figure 1.14: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (After the Third Step - 5) 
 
 
Figure 1.15: An Example of Dijkstra’s Algorithm (Finished) 
 
1.3.2.2 Other Related Algorithms 
In computer science, there are several algorithms which share the same 
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essential properties with Dijkstra’s Algorithm. But they are different in 
details and thus suitable for special cases. Here we have a review on them 
one after one. 
 
1.3.2.3 Bellman-Ford Algorithm 
Bellman-Ford Algorithm (Ford, 1956 and Bellman, 1958) is one of such 
algorithms. If we treat the distance between two nodes is a kind of path 
cost, in Dijkstra’s Algorithm, all the path costs are non-negative. If there is 
negative path cost on the map, Dijkstra’s Algorithm cannot identify it. 
Compared with Dijkstra’s Algorithm, Bellman-Ford Algorithm can identify 
negative path costs. But it requires more calculation time since there is a 
final scan at the end of the algorithm.  
 
If there is a cycle with negative cost on the map, no cheapest path from the 
initial node to the destination exists. Since any path can be cheaper after 
one more walk around the negative-cost cycle. But the negative path 
cannot be identified by following Dijkstra’s Algorithm since this algorithm 
visit each node at most once.  
 
Although the Bellman-Ford Algorithm follows Dijkstra’s Algorithm to obtain 
the potential cheapest path, once the path has been identified, a final scan 
of the whole map is applied to check if there is any negative cycle. In the 
scan, for each node i in the map, if the sum of the tentative cost of i and 
the cost between i and its neighbour node j is less than the tentative cost 
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of i, a negative path cost is identified. It can be shown as follows. 
𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗 < 𝑐𝑖 
The path between node i and j has negative path cost. 
Here 𝑐𝑖 denotes a node i on the map, and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 denotes the path cost 
between i and one of its neighbour nodes j.  
 
Figure 1.16 shows an example to show how Bellman-Ford Algorithm 
identifies negative path cost. This map is modified from the map we used 
for illustrating Dijkstra’s Algorithm. The only modification is that the path 
cost between 𝑛3 and 𝑛5 is -3 instead of 3. 
 
It is obvious to see that, by Dijkstra’s Algorithm, a route with “the minimum 
path cost” can be identified. The route and minimum path cost is 
illustrated in Figure 1.16. With this algorithm, a visited node will never be 
visited again. However, in the figure, we can see that, the minimum path 
cost for this map is actually infinite. Since every time visiting one of 𝑛3 
and 𝑛5 from the other, the minimum path cost can be reduced by three. 
It is an infinite loop. Thus Dijkstra’s Algorithm identifies an incorrect route 
with an incorrect minimum path cost. 
 
By the Bellman-Ford Algorithm, there is a final scan after finding the 
possible route with “the minimum path cost”. In the final scan, if the 
tentative cost assigned on one node plus the cost to one of its neighbour 
node is less than the tentative cost itself, there is a path with negative cost 
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between the two nodes. In the figure, we can see that, the tentative cost 
for  𝑛3 is ten, and the cost between 𝑛3 and its neighbour node 𝑛5 is 
minus three. The sum of these two numbers is seven, which is less than ten. 
And for 𝑛5, the tentative cost is seven, and the cost between 𝑛5 and its 
neighbour node 𝑛3 is minus three. The sum of these two numbers is four, 
which is less than seven. Thus, a path with negative cost between 𝑛3 and 
𝑛5 is identified. 
 
Figure 1.16: A Map with Negative Path Cost 
 
1.3.2.4 A* Algorithm 
A* Algorithm (Hart et al 1968) is also a computer science algorithm for 
finding the minimum-cost path, or in the distance scenario, finding the 
shortest path. It cannot identify a path with negative cost, but it has higher 
efficiency than Dijkstra’s Algorithm.  
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The higher efficiency comes from a heuristic estimate of the cost from 
node i to the destination. Unlike Dijkstra’s algorithm and Bellman-Ford 
algorithm, A* algorithm takes into account not only the forward path, but 
also the cost of travelled path. Thus, the tentative cost in this algorithm 
denotes the tentative cost from the initial node to the destination rather 
than to node i. It is composed of two elements, and can be presented as 
follows. 
𝑡𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 + ℎ𝑖  
Suppose node i is under consideration, then 𝑡𝑖 denotes the tentative cost 
for the whole route calculated at node i. 𝑑𝑖 denotes the actual cost from 
the initial node to the node i. ℎ𝑖  denotes the heuristic-estimate cost from 
node i to the destination. Here ℎ𝑖  has to be an admissible heuristic. It 
means that, ℎ𝑖  should not overestimate the cost from node i to the 
destination. For instance, in the distance scenario, ℎ𝑖  should no more 
than the minimum actual cost from node i to the destination. Usually, it 
equals to the linear distance from node i to the destination. 
 
The A* algorithm can be decomposed into several steps. First, an empty set 
is constructed. It can be called a consideration set. Second, all the 
neighbour nodes of the initial node are put into the consideration set. 
Third, there is a calculation of the tentative cost for each node in the 
consideration set. Here the tentative cost for node i is the actual cost from 
the initial node to the node plus the heuristic-estimate cost from that node 
to the destination. Fourth, the node with the smallest tentative node is 
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removed from the consideration set. And all its neighbour nodes are added 
into this set and their tentative costs are calculated.  Fifth, if the 
destination is removed from the set or the smallest tentative cost in the set 
is infinite, the algorithm is finished. In the second case, there is no 
connection between any node in the set and the destination. Sixth, the 
third step is repeated till either case in the fifth step appears. 
 
The example we used for illustrating Dijkstra’s Algorithm can also be used 
for illustrating the A* algorithm. In Figure 1.17, all the neighbour nodes of 
the initial node 𝑛1 is added in to the consideration set. They are 𝑛2, 𝑛3, 
and 𝑛4. Their tentative cost can be calculated as follows. 
𝑡2 = 𝑑2 + ℎ2 = 15 + 1.5 = 16.5 
𝑡3 = 𝑑3 + ℎ3 = 10 + 1 = 11 
𝑡4 = 𝑑4 + ℎ4 = 6 + 17 = 23 
Here for 𝑡4, the heuristic-estimate cost is also the actual cost from 𝑛4 to 
the destination 𝑛6. 
 
Then according to the third step, the node with the smallest tentative cost 
should be removed from the consideration set. Here 𝑛3 is removed. Then 
all its neighbour nodes are added into the set. Here 𝑛3 has only one 
neighbour node outside the set, which is 𝑛5. The tentative cost of 𝑛5 can 
be calculated as follows. 
𝑡5 = 𝑑5 + ℎ5 = 13 + 5 = 18 
Here for 𝑡5, the heuristic-estimate cost is also the actual cost from 𝑛5 to 
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the destination n6. 
 
Figure 1.17: An Example of the A* Algorithm (After the Second Step) 
 
 
Figure 1.18: An Example of the A* Algorithm (After the third Step-1) 
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Figure 1.18 illustrates the scenario after the third step for the first iteration. 
Now there are three nodes, 𝑛2, 𝑛4, 𝑛5, in the consideration set. Neither 
of the two cases in the fifth step is satisfied, thus it goes to the sixth step 
and then repeat the third step once more. 
 
This time the node with the smallest tentative cost is 𝑛2. It is removed 
from the set. And it has no neighbour node outside the set. It is obvious to 
see that, the route through 𝑛2 to 𝑛5 costs more than the route through 
𝑛3 to 𝑛5. 𝑛2 can be abandoned since it is not on the optimal route. 
 
Now follow the third step again, the node with the smallest tentative cost 
is 𝑛5. It is removed from the set. 𝑛5 has only one neighbour node, which 
is 𝑛6, the destination. 𝑛6 is added to the set. Neither of the two cases in 
the fifth step is satisfied, thus it goes to the sixth step and then repeat the 
third step once more. 
 
Figure 1.19 illustrates the scenario after the second iteration of the third 
step. It is obvious to see that the destination has the smallest tentative cost. 
Then the destination is removed from the consideration set. The first case 
in the fifth step is satisfied, and the algorithm is finished. 
 
Figure 1.20 illustrates the finished version of this example. The optimal 
route and the smallest cost is exactly the same as Figure 1.15. The A* 
algorithm gets the same results as Dijkstra’s algorithm, but is more efficient. 
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In A* algorithm, the problem is solved after the third iteration. In Dijkstra’s 
algorithm, the problem is solved after the sixth iteration. 
 
Figure 1.19: An Example of the A* Algorithm (After the third Step-2) 
 
 
Figure 1.20: An Example of the A* Algorithm (Finished) 
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1.3.2.5 Other Algorithms for the Shortest Path Problem 
Besides Dijkstra’s algorithm, the Bellman-Ford algorithm, and the A* 
algorithm, there are some other algorithms developed to solve the 
shortest path problem. For instance, there are Floyd–Warshall algorithm 
(Floyd, 1962 and Warshall, 1962), Johnson's algorithm (Johnson, 1977), 
Viterbi algorithm (Viterbi, 1967), and so on. 
 
These algorithms are developed from the three algorithms we have 
mentioned above. They are designed for solving specific computer science 
problems. We have explained the three algorithms in details, and have 
illustrated the essential of solving the shortest path problem sufficiently 
before go into our optimal problem. Discussing more about other 
algorithms will not add more help for solving our problem, which is a 
crucially different one. 
 
1.3.3 Our Algorithm 
1.3.3.1 Impossibility of Identifying All the Possible Routes 
In our problem, there is seemingly a straightforward way to find the 
optimal route with the smallest energy expenditure. We only need to 
identify all the possible routes from the starting square to the destination. 
Then we calculate the energy expenditure for each route, and select the 
one with the smallest energy expenditure.  
 
However, this mission is impossible in our case. For a 200 by 200 map, the 
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number of all the possible routes is huge, even if for each route, each 
square can be passed at most once. Here is an example to illustrate the 
amount of the possible routes as the dimension of the map increases. In 
order to simplify the example, we put two restrictions here. First, on each 
route, a square can never be passed more than once. Second, if square A 
shares a boundary with square B, moving from A to B is always a direct 
move. Specifically, moving from A to B is always A to B, rather than A to 
other squares, and then to B.  
 
These two restrictions can reduce the number of routes to be analysed 
without distorting the result of finding the optimal route. Since all the 
moving costs are non-negative in our problem, revisiting a square will 
cause unnecessary energy expenditure. It is weakly dominated by visiting a 
square at most once. Similarly, moving to a neighbour square in a 
roundabout way also may cause unnecessary energy expenditure.  
 
Figure 1.21 is a 2 by 2 map. The number in each square only denotes the 
label of that square. Square 1 is the starting square and square 4 is the 
destination. Taken the two restrictions above into consideration, all the 
possible routes can be identified. There are only two possible routes. One 
is 1-2-4 and the other is 1-3-4. 
3 4 
1 2 
Figure 1.21: A 2 by 2 Map 
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Figure 1.22 is a 3 by 3 map. Square 1 is the starting square, and square 9 is 
the destination.  There are six possible routes in total. They are 1-2-3-6-9, 
1-2-5-6-9, 1-2-5-8-9, 1-4-5-6-9, 1-4-5-8-9, and 1-4-7-8-9. 
7 8 9 
4 5 6 
1 2 3 
Figure 1.22: A 3 by 3 Map 
 
Now we increase the size of the map to be 4 by 4. It is illustrated in Figure 
1.23.  
 
Square 1 is the starting square and square 16 is the destination. It is still 
possible to enumerate all the possible routes under the two restrictions. 
There are twenty possible routes in total.  They are listed in Table 1.3.  
13 14 15 16 
9 10 11 12 
5 6 7 8 
1 2 3 4 
Figure 1.23: A 4 by 4 Map 
 
It is obvious to see that the number of the possible routes is exponentially 
growing as the size of the matrix increasing. For a 5 by 5 matrix, there are 
70 possible routes. It is already difficult to enumerate each route. And for a 
6 by 6 matrix, it is even difficult to calculate the number of the possible 
routes manually.  
 
Our map is a 200 by 200 matrix. Obviously the number of all the possible 
routes is huge. It is theoretically possible but practically difficult to identify 
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each route, calculate their energy expenditure, and choose the optimal one. 
This task is even overwhelming for a personal computer to calculate.  
 
This is the reason for why we cannot identify all the possible routes and 
select the optimal one directly. We have to seek for some efficient 
algorithm to solve our optimal problem. Here the efficiency means that, by 
such an algorithm, an optimal route can be identified by personal 
computer in a tolerable time span.  
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 
1 2 3 4 8 12 16 
1 2 3 7 8 12 16 
1 2 3 7 11 12 16 
1 2 3 7 11 15 16 
1 2 6 7 8 12 16 
1 2 3 7 11 12 16 
1 2 3 7 11 15 16 
1 2 3 10 11 12 16 
1 2 3 10 11 15 16 
1 2 3 10 14 15 16 
1 5 6 7 8 12 16 
1 5 6 7 11 12 16 
1 5 6 7 11 15 16 
1 5 6 10 11 12 16 
1 5 6 10 11 15 16 
1 5 6 10 14 15 16 
1 5 6 10 11 12 16 
1 5 6 10 11 15 16 
1 5 6 10 14 15 16 
1 5 6 13 14 15 16 
Table 1.3: Possible Routes for a 4 by 4 Matrix 
 
Nevertheless, there is no ready algorithm in economics for solving our 
problem. We have to borrow some ideas from computer science. They 
have some algorithms to solve the shortest path problem, which share 
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some similarities with our problem. 
 
1.3.3.2 Relationship between the Shortest Path Problem and Our 
Problem 
As we have mentioned before, although the contexts of the shortest path 
problem and our problem are not the same, they can be regarded as 
one-to-one mapping. 
 
In the first place, the aims of the two problems are similar. For solving the 
shortest path problem, a route from the initial node to the destination with 
the smallest distance has to be identified. For solving our optimal route 
problem, a route from the starting square to the destination with the 
smallest energy expenditure has to be identified.   
 
What is more, in both the problems, moving is restricted and not free. In 
the shortest path problem, moving can only happen between two 
neighbour nodes. Here neighbour means there is a path between that 
node and the current node. And distance can be regarded as a kind of cost 
of moving from one node to the other. In our optimal route problem, 
moving can only happens between two neighbour squares. Here neighbour 
means that square sharing a bound with the current square. And energy is 
expended while moving.  
 
In addition, for the two problems, the ways of calculating the expenditure 
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are the same. For the shortest path problem, the distance for the whole 
journey is the sum of the distance between each two neighbour nodes on 
the route. And for our optimal route problem, the total expenditure of 
energy is the sum of the energy expenditure of each step moving on the 
route. 
 
1.3.3.3 Differences between the Shortest Path Problem and Our Problem 
However, we cannot directly use the shortest path problem to solve our 
problem. First, none of the algorithms reviewed above can go backward. 
Algorithms for shortest path problem only consider the path in the area 
between the initial node and the destination. They start from the initial 
node and goes towards the destination directly. But on our map, part of 
the optimal route is possibly outside the area between the starting square 
and the destination. For instance, the subject might have to go backwards 
from the starting square and move several squares in the opposite 
direction to that towards the destination, since going directly toward the 
destination might be extremely costly. 
 
Figure 1.24 illustrates an example. A is the starting square and B is the 
destination. Following the algorithm of shortest path problem, all the 
possible routes are constrained in the 3 by 3 matrix with the bold boundary. 
Thus, the optimal route should also be constrained in this area. However, 
in our problem, the optimal route might be out of the area. Our scenario is 
travelling across hilly country. Suppose H and I are two high mountains, but 
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the path A-C-D-E-F-G-B is a flat path with zero energy expenditure.  Thus a 
rational person should go one-square backward and follow the flat path, 
rather than go directly toward the destination through H or I. And in this 
case, A-C-D-E-F-G-B is the optimal route which cannot be identified by the 
algorithms of shortest path problem. 
          
          
      B   
  H   G   
  A I F   
  C D E   
          
Figure 1.24: Difference between Shortest Path Algorithm and Our Algorithm 
 
Second, the way of calculating the expenditure of moving from one square 
to the other is different. In the shortest path problem, the moving cost is 
regardless of the direction. The expenditure of moving from node A to 
node B is the same as the expenditure of moving from node B to node A. 
However, in our problem, the direction matters. The moving cost depends 
on the relative amount of the value on the current square and the value on 
the moving-to square. The expenditure of moving from A to B is usually 
different from the expenditure of moving from B to A. As we have 
mentioned, our story is travelling across the country. The terrain is hilly and 
as is common sense, going uphill consumes more energy than going 
downhill.  
 
For instance, square A is assigned with a value x, square B is assigned with 
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a value y, and x is greater than y. In our problem, moving from A to B is 
downhill, and the energy expenditure is the absolute difference between x 
and y. But moving from B to A is uphill, and the energy expenditure is twice 
the absolute difference between x and y. 
 
Third, even with the most efficient algorithm, A*, the calculation load of a 
200 by 200 matrix is overwhelming for a personal computer using MATLAB. 
It can take several days if the variance of the values on a map is large 
enough, and could end with a crash as the computer overloads and runs 
out of storage space. Thus, we need to produce a more efficient method 
which can be run on a personal computer within a tolerable time span. 
 
1.3.3.4 The Idea of Our Algorithm 
As we have mentioned above, the shortest path problem is a kind of 
one-to-one mapping of our problem, but we cannot use the algorithm 
directly. We have to borrow some ideas from those algorithms and 
produce our own algorithm for finding the optimal route. 
 
The key ideas of our algorithm are “expanding” and “updating”. These can 
solve not only the “backward steps” but also the workload of calculation. 
We also modify the way of calculating the moving cost between two 
squares. In our context, the relative amount of the value on the current 
square and the value on the moving-to square does affect the expenditure. 
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In our algorithm, the map is an n by n matrix. Each value in the matrix 
denotes the height of that area. The subject can only move to the squares 
sharing bounds with the current square. If the value on the current square 
is less than the value of the moving-to square, the subject goes uphill with 
the energy expenditure twice the absolute difference of the two squares. If 
the value on the current square is greater than the value of the moving-to 
square, the subject goes downhill with the energy expenditure just the 
absolute difference of the two squares. 
 
Our algorithm can be decomposed into several steps. First, it starts with a 3 
by 3 matrix. The destination is in the middle of the matrix. More specifically, 
the destination is in the second row and the second column of this matrix.  
 
Second, the optimal costs of moving from any of the four squares sharing 
boundaries with the destination can be calculated. They are just the cost of 
moving from that square to the destination. The four squares are marked 
as considered. 
 
Third, based on the current information, for all the unconsidered squares, 
the optimal cost from each square to the destination is calculated. In the 3 
by 3 matrix, the unconsidered squares are the four squares in the four 
corners. Each of them share boundaries with two considered squares. The 
minimum energy expenditure from an unconsidered square i to the 
destination can be illustrated as follows. 
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𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑖, 𝑥) + 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑖, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸(𝑖, 𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2) 
Here x and y denote the two squares sharing boundaries with the square i, 
and d denotes the destination. E(i,x) is the expenditure of moving from i to 
x; E(x,d) is the expenditure of moving from x to the destination. Obviously, 
there are two possible routes for moving from i to the destination. The 
expenditure for moving from each of the routes is calculated and are 
denoted by 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 respectively. Then the minimum expenditure from 
i to the destination is the smaller of 𝐸1 and 𝐸2. 
 
Fourth, after calculating the minimum expenditure from each square in the 
3 by 3 matrix to the destination, we expand the matrix two rows and two 
columns wider. We expand the matrix symmetrically. That is, a new row 
and a new column is added to be the first row and the first column. And a 
new row and a new column is added to be the last row and the last column. 
Now all the minimum expenditures calculated for the old matrix are 
regarded as only tentative optimal expenditures. Since new information is 
now to be incorporated, the true optimal expenditure for those squares 
might be changed. 
 
We have discussed that the workload of going through the whole matrix to 
identify every possible route, and then selecting the one with the minimum 
energy expenditure is overwhelming for a personal computer, especially 
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when the matrix is big. Using tentative optimal values can save a lot of 
workload of calculation. However, the new rows and columns have no 
tentative optimal values assigned. Thus, fifth, we have to assign tentative 
optimal values on them before we do the optimal calculation. In this step, 
we treat different types of squares differently. 
 
The first type is the second square in the first row, first column, last row, 
and last column respectively. They are chosen as an entry point of 
assigning tentative optimal values on the new squares. And they have to be 
adjusted later. In this step, the moving paths of the four squares are 
considered compulsory at this stage of the algorithm (they will be updated 
if necessary later). This procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.25. 
 𝑥1    
𝑥2 𝑦1  𝑦2 𝑥3 
  d   
 𝑦3    
 𝑥4    
Figure 1.25: The First Type Squares in Fifth Step 
 
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4 are all the first type squares. In order to calculate the 
tentative optimal values, the algorithm makes it compulsory to move from 
𝑥1 or 𝑥2 to 𝑦1, from 𝑥3 to 𝑦2, and from 𝑥4 to 𝑦3. Thus the tentative 
optimal expenditure from i to d can be calculated by the following 
expression: 
𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
Here E(x,y) is the actual expenditure from x to y, and E(y,d) is the tentative 
optimal expenditure from y to d, which has been calculated in the third 
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step. 
 
The second type squares can be separated into two parts. One part starts 
from the third column and ends at the penultimate column of the first row 
and the last row respectively. The other part starts from the third row and 
ends at the penultimate row of the first column and the last column 
respectively. They are illustrated in Figure 1.26. 
 𝑧 𝑥∗ 𝑥  
𝑧  𝑦 𝑦 𝑧 
𝑥∗ 𝑦 d 𝑦 𝑥∗ 
𝑥 𝑦 𝑦 𝑦 𝑥 
 𝑧 𝑥∗ 𝑥  
Figure 1.26: The Second Type Squares in Fifth Step 
 
In Figure 1.26, 𝑥∗ and x are both what we call type two squares. The only 
difference between 𝑥∗ and x is that, 𝑥∗ can be reached from z. Or more 
specifically, there are two choices of moving from 𝑥∗, moving to y or to z. 
And there are also two ways of moving from x, moving to 𝑥∗ or moving to 
y. The tentative optimal expenditure of 𝑥∗ can be expressed as follows. 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥
∗, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥
∗, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐸(𝑥∗, 𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2) 
Here 𝐸(𝑥∗, 𝑦) and 𝐸(𝑥∗, 𝑧) are the actual expenditures of moving from 
𝑥∗ to y or z respectively. 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) and 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) are the tentative optimal 
expenditures from y or z to the destination respectively. And in the same 
way, we can calculate the tentative optimal expenditure from x. We just 
have to replace z with 𝑥∗. 
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The third type of squares is the four squares in the corners. They are 
illustrated in Figure 1.27. 
X y  y x 
𝑧    𝑧 
  d   
Z    z 
X y  y x 
Figure 1.27: The Third Type Squares in Fifth Step 
 
All of the x are the third type squares. Moving from any x, there are two 
possible moves, to y or to z. Thus the tentative optimal expenditure from x 
can be expressed as follows: 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2) 
Here 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) are the actual expenditures of moving from x 
to y or z respectively. And 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) and 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) are the tentative optimal 
expenditures of moving from y or z to d respectively.  
 
After all the three types of squares have been considered, all the new 
squares have been assigned a tentative optimal value. Now, in the sixth 
step, we have to adjust the tentative values for the whole matrix. There are 
also three types of squares here. The first type squares are the squares 
from the old matrix. Since new information comes, the map is changed. 
The tentative optimal expenditures of these squares might be also changed. 
It is illustrated in Figure 1.28. 
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 v    
u x y   
 z d   
     
     
Figure 1.28: The First Type Squares for Adjusting 
 
The values adjusted in this step are the tentative optimal expenditures of 
the squares with bold boundaries. In the example, we can see that, now 
from square x, there are four directions, u, v, y ,z to move to. Thus the 
tentative optimal expenditure can be adjusted as follows. 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑢) + 𝐸(𝑢, 𝑑) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑣) + 𝐸(𝑣, 𝑑) 
𝐸3 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸4 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐸5 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) 
𝐸∗(𝑥, 𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3, 𝐸4, 𝐸5) 
Here E(x,u), E(x,v), E(x,y), and E(x,z) are the actual expenditure of moving 
from x to u, v, y, z respectively. E(u,d), E(v,d), E(y,d), E(z,d) and E(x,d) are 
the tentative optimal expenditures of moving from u, v, y, z, x to the 
destination respectively. And 𝐸∗(𝑥, 𝑑)  denotes the adjusted value of 
E(x,d). 
 
The second type squares for adjusting are the squares on the boundaries of 
the new matrix, except the squares in the four corners. They are illustrated 
in Figure 1.29. 
60 
 
w x z   
 y    
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Figure 1.29: The Second Type Squares for Adjusting 
 
The values adjusted in this step are the tentative optimal expenditures of 
the squares with bold boundaries in Figure 1.30. In the illustrated example, 
from square x, there are three possible squares, w, y, z, to move to. Thus 
the tentative optimal expenditure can be adjusted as follows. 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑤) + 𝐸(𝑢, 𝑤) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸3 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐸4 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) 
𝐸∗(𝑥, 𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3, 𝐸4) 
Here E(x,w),  E(x,y), and E(x,z) are the actual expenditure of moving from 
x to w, y, z respectively. E(w,d), E(y,d), E(z,d) and E(x,d) are the tentative 
optimal expenditure of moving from w, y, z, x to the destination 
respectively. And 𝐸∗(𝑥, 𝑑) denotes the adjusted value of E(x,d). 
 
The third type squares for adjusting are the squares in the four corners. 
They can be illustrated in Figure 1.30. 
 
The values adjusted in this step are the tentative optimal expenditures of 
the squares with bold boundaries in Figure 1.30.  
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Figure 1.30: The Third Type Squares for Adjusting 
 
In the illustrated example, from square x there are two possible squares, y, 
and z, to move to.  
Thus the tentative optimal expenditures can be adjusted as follows. 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐸3 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) 
𝐸∗(𝑥, 𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3) 
Here E(x,y) and E(x,z) are the actual expenditures of moving from x to y and 
z respectively. E(y,d), E(z,d) and E(x,d) are the tentative optimal 
expenditures of moving from y, z and x to the destination respectively. And 
𝐸∗(𝑥, 𝑑) denotes the adjusted value of E(x,d). 
 
After all the tentative optimal expenditures in the matrix have been 
adjusted, we can go onto the seventh step. This step is the most important 
one. Each square on the map is assigned an optimisation equation. By 
solving the simultaneous equations of optimisation, the actual optimal 
energy expenditure for each square of the current matrix can be calculated. 
In the equations set, there are three different types of equations, 
corresponding to three different types of square positions in the matrix. 
They are just the three types of squares we have examined in the sixth step. 
62 
 
They are squares in the middle of the matrix, squares on the boundaries, 
and squares in the corners. Thus, we can use Figure 1.28, Figure 1.29, and 
Figure 1.30 to describe the three types of equations. 
 
The first type of equations is for the squares with bold boundaries in Figure 
1.28. The equation F(x) for these can be illustrated as follows. 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑢) + 𝐸(𝑢, 𝑑) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑣) + 𝐸(𝑣, 𝑑) 
𝐸3 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸4 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3, 𝐸4) 
The second type of equations is for the squares with bold boundaries in 
Figure 1.29. The equation F(x) can be illustrated as follows. 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑤) + 𝐸(𝑢, 𝑤) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸3 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3) 
And the third type of equations is for the squares with bold boundaries in 
Figure 1.30. The equation F(x) for these can be illustrated as follows. 
𝐸1 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑑) 
𝐸2 = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑧, 𝑑) 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑑) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐸1, 𝐸2) 
Once all the F(x) in the equations are set equal zero, the simultaneous 
functions are solved. And then the E(x,d) is the actual optimal energy 
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expenditure from square x to the destination for the current map. 
 
In order to solving the simultaneous equations, there is a starting value for 
each E(x,d). Then the computer adjust the starting value and searches for 
the set of E(x,d) to make all the F(x) equal to zero simultaneously. If the 
map is large enough, and if the variance of the heights on the map is big, 
the workload of calculation is overwhelming for a personal computer. If the 
start value of E(x,d) is not chosen carefully, the calculation project may end 
up without convergence. That means the simultaneously equations cannot 
be solved by the computer. Thus, the starting value is very important. An 
appropriate set of starting value eases the calculation burden. Actually, all 
we were doing before the seventh step is trying to find an appropriate set 
for the starting value. At the end of the sixth step, the adjusted tentative 
optimal values are close to, if they are not the same as, the actual optimal 
values. Using them as the starting values, the simultaneous equations can 
be solved very quickly. More specifically, a 41 by 41 matrix can be solved 
within five minutes. 
 
At the end of the seventh step, the actual optimal energy expenditure from 
each square to the destination of the current map is identified. In the 
eighth step, if the current map is not the whole map to be examined, the 
algorithm repeats from the fourth step to the seventh step. Once the 
current map is the whole map to be examined, the algorithm is finished.  
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We have mentioned that, in our context, sometimes the optimal route 
goes away from the destination. So we cannot only examine a map with 
the starting square at one corner and the destination at the centre. We 
have to examine a map on which the starting square and the destination 
are not on the boundary. There has to be sufficient space for possible 
roundabout steps.  
 
Here is an example to illustrate this scenario. Figure 1.31 is a map with 
heights assigned. The square in the fourth row and the second column is 
the starting square, and the square in the middle of the matrix is the 
destination. 
 
If we only estimate the 3 by 3 matrix with the bold boundaries, the optimal 
energy expenditure from the starting square to the destination is 3. 
However, if we estimate the whole map, there is a flat route from the 
starting square to the destination with zero energy expenditure. But it 
requires going away from the destination at the first step.  
 
This kind of route cannot be identified if the map we examined is not large 
enough. Thus, in our algorithm, the starting square is never on the 
boundary of the map. Since the destination is always the centre of the map, 
we do not have to worry about it.  
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2 7 1 4 3 
5 3 1 1 1 
3 2 1 2 1 
6 1 9 3 1 
8 1 1 1 1 
Figure 1.31: Map with Heights for Example 
 
 
1.3.4 Finding the Optimal Route 
1.3.4.1 Programming of the Algorithm 
We have described above our algorithm for finding the optimal route with 
the minimum energy expenditure. It is obvious that the task cannot be 
done by hand. Thus we have to ask the computer to do it for us. We use 
MATLAB to do the programming. All the algorithms and equations are 
translated to code and then run on a personal computer. 
 
Each of our four maps is a 200 by 200 matrix. However, due to time 
limitation, it is impossible for a subject to travel across the whole map. We 
deliberately set 10 seconds as a compulsory thinking time for each step to 
avoiding random clicking. Thus, if a subject travels across the whole map 
for each of the four journeys, it will at least cost more than four hours. It is 
too long for a laboratory experiment. Thus, we only use part of the map. 
For every journey, the destination is 15-squares up and 15-squares right of 
the starting square. By this way, the experiment can be limited in a 
tolerable time span. 
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If we put the destination in the centre and the starting square in the 
bottom-let corner of a matrix, it is a 31 by 31 matrix. But we have discussed 
above that if we only examine a matrix with the starting square on the 
boundary, the true optimal route of the map may not be identified. Since 
the optimal route may go out of the matrix.  
 
Thus, we have to make sure that outside the row and column which 
contains the starting square, there is enough space to be examined to 
allow the optimal route going away from the destination at some point. 
Here we expand five rows down and five columns left to the starting 
square. As in our algorithm, the matrix is expanding symmetrically. So we 
have to also expand five rows up and five rows right to the matrix. Now the 
matrix becomes a 41 by 41 matrix. This is the map we examined in the 
MATLAB program. 
 
The program outputs a 41 by 41 matrix. The number in each cell of the 
matrix measures the minimum energy expenditure from that cell to the 
destination. For obtaining the energy expenditure of the optimal route, we 
only need to find the position of the starting square and see the value 
assigned on it.  
 
With the minimum energy expenditure, we can identify the optimal route. 
This process is also programmed by MATLAB. And it can be described as 
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follows. First, the starting square is marked as the current square. Second, 
the four squares sharing boundaries with the current square is examined 
one after one by the following function. 
𝐸(𝑐, 𝑑) = 𝐸(𝑐, 𝑖) + 𝐸(𝑖, 𝑑) 
𝐸(𝑐, 𝑑) is the minimum energy expenditure from the current square to the 
destination. 𝐸(𝑐, 𝑖) is the energy expenditure from the current square to 
square i which shares a boundary with it. And 𝐸(𝑖, 𝑑) is the minimum 
energy expenditure from square i to the destination. 
 
If a square i satisfies this function, the square is a step on the optimal route. 
The starting square is marked as visited. And square i is marked as the 
current square. The process is repeated till the destination is marked as 
visited. Then the optimal route is identified. 
 
It is possible that two squares sharing boundary with the current square 
can both be a step on the optimal route. This makes the situation 
complicated. The optimal route may not be unique on a map. But as we 
have obtained the minimum energy expenditure, we can control the 
optimal payoff of each journey. We do not have to examine a subject’s 
moving track to see if she or he deviates from a specific optimal route. We 
only have to see if his or her payoff of that journey deviates from the 
optimal payoff. This is more efficient for the analysis of the results. 
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1.3.4.2 Optimal Routes 
As mentioned in the experimental design, there are four different maps in 
any one session of the experiment. Figures 1.32 to Figure 1.35 show the 
optimal routes for the four maps separately. If the subject follows the 
green squares one after one, she or he can reach the destination with the 
least energy expenditure. These routes were identified by our algorithm 
which we have introduced above, given that the full information is 
provided to MATLAB. 
 
At a first glance the four optimal routes have one thing in common – they 
zigzag. None of the optimal routes is straight to the destination (which is 
always to the up and right of the initial square in our experiment). Each of 
the routes sometimes goes in the opposite direction to that towards the 
destination. As we have mentioned before, the optimal route may not be 
unique. But we have checked the maps one after one and deliberately 
modified some of the heights slightly to make sure that there is no “flat” 
optimal route. Here the word “flat” means that go directly to the 
destination without changes of directions. 
 
For Figure 1.32, the optimal route is within the 15 by 15 matrix in which the 
initial square is in the down-left corner and the destination is the upper-left 
corner. However, even in this case, the optimal route is not straight. It 
requires subjects to go down at some point, which is opposite to the 
position of the destination, if they want to obtain least energy expenditure. 
69 
 
 
In Figure 1.33, the optimal route is more zigzagged than that in Figure 1.32. 
Moreover, some part of the route is outside the bounds of the 15 by 15 
matrix. Subjects have to go in the opposite direction at the very beginning 
if they follow the optimal route. And when they approach the destination, 
they also have to go a little bit beyond the destination and turn down to it 
at some point. 
 
In Figure 1.34, the optimal route is also outside the 15 by 15 matrix for 
some part. It is clear to see that, subjects have to keep being outside of the 
matrix for about half way, and then turn to the same direction with the 
destination, approaching it in a zigzag manner. 
 
Since in Figure 1.35, the variance of the heights on the map is much larger 
than in the other three maps, the optimal route is not so zigzag. But 
subjects still have to go a little bit out of the 15 by 15 matrix and then go 
back to the destination in the end of their journey, if they are following the 
optimal route. 
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Figure 1.32: Optimal Route for Journey 1 
 
 
                 Figure 1.33: Optimal Route for Journey 2 
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Figure 1.34: Optimal Route for Journey 3 
 
 
Figure 1.35: Optimal Route for Journey 4 
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1.4 Empirical results and discussion (With Fog) 
The calculated optimal route is without fog. However, we have discussed 
before, in the real world, full information is not always available. The 
experiment is aimed to investigate how people in a world with fog behave 
and how far their behaviour is from the optimal route without fog. 
 
In section 1.4, we introduced our algorithm to identify the optimal route 
without fog. Those optimal routes, as shown in Figure 1.32 to Figure 1.35, 
are quite zigzagged. Sometimes, the optimal steps on the route are away 
from the destination. Obviously, without fog, it is possible to work out the 
optimal route. However, with fog, it is impossible to obtain an optimal 
strategy. An optimal route cannot be identified, since information is not 
sufficient.  
 
Given the task of reaching the destination with the least expenditure of 
energy, subjects cannot work out an optimal strategy to follow. But they do 
have some way to try to approach the optimal strategy as closely as 
possible, which are revealed in their behaviour. What we have done is to 
observe their behaviour, or more precisely, their decisions on each step, 
and to try and describe their underlying strategies.  
 
In a word, optimal routes in the four maps cannot be identified when there 
is fog. Subjects cannot go straight to the destination if they would like to 
maximise their utility/payoff. Thus, intuitively, the payment they received 
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would be quite different from the optimal payment. However, we found 
that, some of the subjects get payments which are very close to or even 
equal to the optimal payoff. In the experiment May 2013, the optimal 
payment was £10 for each map, and in the experiment November 2013, it 
was £15. 
 
In the following section, the data from the experiment is analysed. Section 
1.4.1 describes a brief summary of the average payoff across journeys and 
treatments. In section 1.4.2, four possible strategies are tested to see how 
much of the subjects’ behaviour can be explained. 
 
1.4.1 At First Glance 
We implemented the experiment twice, one in May 2013 and the other in 
November 2013. The only difference between the two experiments was 
the payoff. In the second experiment, we scaled up the payoff. So the 
optimal payoff was £15 instead of £10. Because the scales of payoff are 
different, we summarise the payoff of the two experiments separately. 
 
Table 1.4 is a brief summary of the average payoff of the experiment 
carried out in May 2013. The optimal payoff for each journey was £10. It 
can be seen from the table that there is an obvious difference between the 
average payoff with fog (£6.992) and the optimal payoff without fog (£10). 
The average payoff for all of the four treatments is a little under 70% of the 
optimal payoff. 
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There is an interesting phenomenon which can be observed from Table 1.4. 
In treatment 1, for which both information quality and quantity are high, 
the average payoff is £6.535 ‒ the lowest of the four treatments. However, 
in treatment 4, for which both information quality and information 
quantity are low, the average payoff is £7.177 ‒ the highest of the four 
treatments. This is counter-intuitive. 
 
Table 1.5 is a brief summary of the average payoffs in the experiment 
carried out in November 2013. In this experiment, we used the exactly 
same map, but scaled up the payoffs.  The optimal payoff here is £15 for 
each journey. 
 
We can see that, in Table 1.5, the result is consistent with Table 1.4. In 
treatment 1, both the information quantity and quality are high, but the 
average payoff is the lowest out of the four treatments. However, in 
treatment 4, with both low information quality and quantity, the average 
payoff is the highest out of the four.  
 
If we go a little bit more into detail, we can see that, in treatment 2, with 
high information quality but low information quantity, the average payoff 
is lower than treatment 3, with low information quality but high 
information quantity. 
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One of the possible interpretations of this counter-intuitive phenomenon 
might be that too much information makes subjects confused. The 
mathematical-computational ability of human brain is limited. For example, 
treatment 1 provides information with both high quantity and quality. If a 
subject wants to take all the available information into account the 
workload of calculation is huge. It exceeds the computation ability of an 
ordinary person. The subject may directly give up calculating, or end up 
with a wrong result due to the difficulty of processing so much information. 
Thus, his or her behaviour may deviate from the optimal choice. In 
treatment 4, information is provided with both low quantity and quality. 
The workload for computation is not as heavy as in treatment 1. The 
subject can use such vague information to work out a decision which may 
deviated from the optimal decision, but which leads to an acceptable 
outcome. Such a decision made in treatment 4 is possibly better than the 
decision made in treatment 1. Since quality of calculation in treatment 4 is 
better than in treatment 1. 
 
Payoff Summary (£) 
Experiment May 2013 
 
J1 J2 J3 J4 Average 
T1 6.743 6.323 7.448 5.628 6.535 
T2 8.533 6.277 7.858 5.703 7.092 
T3 7.905 7.198 8.083 5.468 7.163 
T4 8.337 7.243 7.623 5.503 7.177 
Average 7.879 6.760 7.753 5.575 6.992 
Table 1.4: Payoff Summary for Experiment May 2013 
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Payoff Summary (£) 
Experiment November 2013 
 
J1 J2 J3 J4 Average 
T1 11.704 10.279 10.004 8.115 10.025 
T2 13.05 9.8963 11.783 7.3575 10.522 
T3 11.914 10.455 12.105 7.9838 10.614 
T4 12.314 9.825 11.686 8.7341 10.640 
Average 12.245 10.114 11.394 8.048 10.450 
Table 1.5: Payoff Summary for Experiment November 2013 
 
1.4.2 Strategy Tests 
From the experiment, we observed subjects’ behaviour, and have recorded 
each step of their decisions.  
 
If the subject follows the optimal route, in each journey she or he is 
expected to be paid £10 in the first experiment and £15 in the second 
experiment. But from Tables 1.4 and 1.5, we can see that the average 
payoff for any of the four journeys is different from that of the optimal 
payoff. Thus at least the majority of the subjects are not following the 
optimal route. It is not surprising that they do not, since due to the fog, 
they do not have full information about the terrain. 
 
But they must have their own strategies to make decisions when they were 
travelling across the map. We have observed their decisions and have tried 
to identify the strategies that they might have been following. What we 
have done is to construct some possible strategies (which seem to be 
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suggested by their behaviour), and then to explore which one fits the 
subjects’ behaviour best. 
 
1.4.2.1 The Myopic Strategy 
The first strategy we test is called the “Myopic Strategy” (MS). In this 
strategy, the subject is assumed to be very myopic. She or he understands 
the algorithm of the energy expenditure of moving. But she or he ignores 
all the information more than one square away from his or her current 
position. Thus she or he moves to and only moves to the square with the 
minimum energy expenditure. All the four possible directions are taken 
into consideration. Once a square is visited, it will never be visited again, 
because the expenditure of moving is non-negative; non-necessary energy 
expenditure may occur if a square is revisited. For example, the total 
expenditure of moving from A to B, then back to A, and then to C, is at 
least as much as the expenditure of moving from A to C directly.  
 
We have examined the subjects’ decisions step by step. If in a specific step, 
the subject’s moving decision follows the MS, the step is regarded as 
“fitting” this strategy. In some steps, there may be more than one square 
that meets the minimum moving cost. That step is regarded as fitting this 
strategy if and only if the subject moves to one of those qualified squares. 
And the last step of a journey is unconditionally marked as fitting. Since if 
the subject’s current position is next to the destination, his or her best 
choice is just move to the destination, no matter how much the 
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expenditure of moving is to the other squares around. 
 
Table 1.6 shows the result of the MS Test across journeys and treatments. 
The figures in this table record the percentage of moves that are consistent 
with the Myopic Strategy. On average, the subjects’ behaviour in journey 2 
fits the MS best out of the four journeys, which is 57.19%; and the data in 
journey 3 fits this strategy worst, with just 51.44% of the decisions 
consistent with the Myopic Strategy. Similarly, the subjects’ behaviour in 
treatment 4 fits the MS best out of the four treatments; and their 
behaviour in treatment 2 fits this strategy worst (just 53.73% consistent 
with it). More specifically, on average, journey 2 in treatment 4 fits the MS 
best, at 60.19%, while journey 3 in treatment 2 fits this strategy worst, at 
50.19%. 
The Myopic Strategy 
  J1 J2 J3 J4 Average 
T1 55.28% 55.62% 52.15% 57.75% 55.20% 
T2 56.60% 56.46% 50.19% 51.67% 53.73% 
T3 53.28% 57.00% 52.34% 58.16% 55.19% 
T4 59.34% 60.19% 50.99% 56.17% 56.67% 
Average 55.98% 57.19% 51.44% 55.93% 55.14% 
Table 1.6: The Average Fit for Myopic Strategy 
 
1.4.2.2 The Two Direction Myopic Strategy 
The second strategy we seem to have observed in behaviour and which we 
test is called the “Two Direction Myopic Strategy” (TDMS). This strategy is 
very similar to the Myopic Strategy. The only difference between them is 
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that, in TDMS, only two instead of four directions are taken into account. 
The subject is assumed to never move down or left which is opposite to the 
destination. 
 
As we have done in MS, we have examined the subjects’ decisions step by 
step. A specific step is regarded as “fitting” TDMS if and only if the subject’s 
decision can be explained by this strategy. It is possible that in some steps, 
moving to either of the two directions consumes the same amount of 
energy. In this case, the step is regarded as fitting TDMS for the subject 
moves to either of the two directions. And the last step of each journey is 
unconditionally marked as fitting. 
 
Table 1.7 shows the result of the TDMS Test across journeys and 
treatments. On average, the subjects’ behaviour in journey 2 out of the 
four journeys fits this strategy best, at 82.56%. The data in journey 4 fits 
this strategy worst, at 70.50%. Similarly, it is obvious that the subjects’ 
behaviour in treatment 4 out of the four treatments fits the TDMS best, at 
79.13%. The subjects’ behaviour in treatment 2 fits this strategy worst, at 
75.20%. More specifically, on average, journey 2 in treatment 3 fits the 
TDMS best, at 84.76%, while journey 4 in treatment 4 fits the strategy 
worst, at 70.25%. 
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The Two-Direction-Myopic Strategy 
  J1 J2 J3 J4 Average 
T1 77.01% 79.46% 78.26% 70.59% 76.33% 
T2 77.44% 81.76% 73.78% 67.82% 75.20% 
T3 75.41% 84.76% 81.28% 73.30% 78.69% 
T4 79.41% 84.59% 82.28% 70.25% 79.13% 
Average 77.23% 82.56% 78.75% 70.50% 77.26% 
Table 1.7: The Average Fit for Two-Direction-Myopic Strategy 
 
1.4.2.3 The Minimum Difference Strategy 
The third strategy we seem to have observed in behaviour and which we 
test is called the “Minimum Difference Strategy” (MDS). In this strategy, 
the subject is assumed to be even more naive than in the Myopic Strategy. 
She or he does not use the algorithm to calculate the energy expenditure 
of moving. She or he only cares about the difference between the heights 
of his or her current position and the squares that she or he can move to. 
And in this strategy, she or he ignores all the information more than one 
square away from the current position. Thus, she or he moves to and only 
moves to the square with the minimum height difference of his or her 
current position. All the four possible directions are taken into account. 
And once a square is visited, it will never be visited again. 
 
As we did for MS and TDMS, we have examined the subjects’ decisions step 
by step. If in a specific step, the subject’s decision follows the MDS, the 
step is regarded as “fitting” this strategy. In some steps, from the current 
position, there may be more than one possible squares that fit the strategy. 
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That step is regarded as “fitting” if and only if the subject moves to one of 
those qualified squares. And the last step of each journey is unconditionally 
regarded as fitting. Since if the subject’s current position is next to the 
destination, the only best choice is to move to the destination directly.  
 
Table 1.8 shows the average fit of the MDS Test across journeys and 
treatments. On average, the subjects’ behaviour in journey 1 fits the MDS 
best out of the four journeys, at 58.27%. In journey 3 it fits the strategy 
worst, at 48.96%. Similarly, the subjects’ behaviour in treatment 4 fits the 
MDS best out of the four treatments, at 55.68%, while behaviour in 
treatment 2 fits this strategy worst, at 52.16%. More specifically, on 
average, journey 1 in treatment 4 fits the MDS best, at 61.54%, while 
journey 3 in treatment 2 fits this strategy worst, at 45.51%. 
The Minimum-Difference Strategy 
  J1 J2 J3 J4 Average 
T1 56.59% 54.00% 50.91% 51.10% 53.15% 
T2 60.76% 52.75% 45.51% 49.60% 52.16% 
T3 54.75% 55.03% 49.73% 54.06% 53.39% 
T4 61.54% 57.32% 49.82% 54.02% 55.68% 
Average 58.27% 54.67% 48.96% 52.11% 53.50% 
Table 1.8: The Average Fit for Minimum-Difference Strategy 
 
1.4.2.4 The Two Direction Minimum Difference Strategy 
The fourth strategy we test is called the “Two Direction Minimum 
Difference Strategy” (TDMDS). This strategy is very similar to the Minimum 
Difference Strategy. The only difference between them is that, in TDMDS, 
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only two instead of four directions are taken into account. The subject is 
assumed to never move down or left, which is in the opposite direction to 
the destination. 
 
As we have done in MDS, we have examined the subjects’ decisions step by 
step. A specific step is regarded as “fitting” TDMDS if and only if the 
subject’s decision can be explained by this strategy. It is possible that in 
some steps, the heights of the two possible directions are the same. That is 
the differences between the current position and either of the two possible 
moving-to squares are the same. In this case, the step is regarded as fitting 
TDMDS if the subject moves to either of the two directions. And the last 
step of each journey is unconditionally regarded as fitting. 
 
Table 1.9 shows the result of the TDMDS Test across journeys and 
treatments. On average, the subjects’ behaviour in journey 2 out of the 
four journeys fits this strategy best, at 78.39%; and the data in journey 4 
fits this strategy worst, at 72.20%. Similarly, the subjects’ behaviour in 
treatment 4 out of the four treatments fits the TDMDS best, at 77.87%, 
while in treatment 2 fits this strategy worst, at 72.75%. More specifically, 
on average, journey 2 in treatment 3 fits the TDMDS best, at 81.02%, while 
journey 3 in treatment 2 fits this strategy worst, at 68.85%. 
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The Two-Direction-Minimum-Difference Strategy 
  J1 J2 J3 J4 Average 
T1 74.39% 75.65% 75.79% 71.68% 74.38% 
T2 75.71% 76.40% 68.85% 70.06% 72.75% 
T3 73.79% 81.02% 77.40% 73.96% 76.54% 
T4 77.45% 80.93% 79.80% 73.30% 77.87% 
Average 75.24% 78.39% 75.27% 72.20% 75.28% 
Table 1.9: The Average Fit for Two-Direction-Minimum-Difference Strategy 
 
1.4.3 Discussion 
We have observed the subjects’ decisions and tested their behaviour 
against four different possible strategies. On average, none of them can 
explain the subjects’ behaviour more than 90%. In a specific journey of a 
specific treatment, one strategy can at most explain about 85% of the 
subjects’ decisions. However, in some journeys of some treatments, the 
strategies only ‘explain’ about 45% of the subjects’ behaviour. It means 
that each of the four strategies have limited ability to explain the subjects’ 
behaviour. One possible reason is that the strategies assume that subjects 
are extremely myopic: they simply ignore all information which is beyond 
the squares one squares away from their current position. In the 
experiment, they might actually have taken more information into account 
and applied some more sophisticated strategies at least in some specific 
steps.  
 
Table 1.10 shows that, the two-direction strategies, TDMS, and TDMDS, fit 
subjects’ behaviour better than the four-direction strategies, MS and MDS. 
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And compared with TDMDS, TDMS fits subjects’ behaviour much better. In 
the table, TDMS is the best fitting strategy for journey 1, 2, and 3 across all 
the four treatments. TDMDS is the best fitting strategy just for journey 4, 
but also across all the four treatments. 
 
One possible explanation of this phenomenon can be stated below. 
Subjects actually calculated the expenditure for each step in the 
experiment, but they were too tired to do careful computation in the last 
journey. In TDMS, subjects are assumed to understand the algorithm of the 
energy expenditure of moving. They know that moving uphill is more 
expensive than moving downhill. However, in TDMDS, subjects are 
assumed to only take into account the absolute difference between the 
heights of the current position and the squares that can be moved to. They 
do not use the algorithm to calculate the energy expenditure of moving 
carefully. In the experiment, journeys come one after one, in the order of 1 
to 4. In the first three journeys, TDMS fits better than TDMDS. It implies 
that subjects were calculating the energy expenditure of moving carefully. 
But in journey 4, TDMDS fits better than TDMS. It might because subjects 
had done too much calculation and got bored or tired. They adjusted the 
strategy to roughly estimate the expenditure rather than work out the 
accurate result. In different treatments, subjects were different. But for all 
the treatments, TDMS is consistently fitting better than TDMDS for journey 
1, 2, and 3, while TDMDS is consistently fitting better than TDMS for 
journey 4. It increases the credibility of the above explanation. 
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Table 1.11 shows that the four-direction strategies, MS, and MDS, fit 
subjects’ behaviour worse than the two-direction strategies, TDMS and 
TDMDS. Compared with MS, MDS fits subjects’ behaviour even worse. In 
the table, MS is the worst fitting strategy for journey 1 across all the four 
treatments. And TDMDS is the worst fitting strategy for journey 2, 3, and 4, 
also across all the four treatments. 
 
Overall, MDS fits subjects’ behaviour worse than MS. One possible 
explanation is a possible filtration of behaviour. Those subjects considering 
four directions rather than two are more likely to be less lazy (or more 
sophisticated) than others. Thus they are more likely to calculate energy 
expenditure of moving carefully rather than just roughly estimating it. 
However, in journey 1, MS fits worse than MDS. It might because the 
subjects were not getting used to the workload of computation at the 
beginning of the experiment, and hence they only do rough estimation for 
the four directions. As practiced in journey 1, they adjusted their strategy 
to do the accurate calculation in the rest journeys. 
 
Compared with the Two Direction Myopic Strategy, on average the Myopic 
Strategy fits each journey in each treatment worse. It is not surprising, 
since MS takes all the four directions into account. But in the experiment, if 
a subject has decided to ignore all the information one squares away from 
his or her current square, it implies that she or he is myopic. And she or he 
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is very likely to also ignore the directions which do not directly lead to the 
destination. In the same way, the Two Direction Minimum Difference 
Strategy fits all the four journeys in all the four treatments better than MS. 
 
Compared with the Minimum Difference Strategy, on average, MS fits all 
the four journeys in treatment 1 worse. But it fits all the four journeys in 
the other three treatments better than MDS. This is very reasonable. As we 
have said before, the subject might adjust his or her strategies map after 
map. She or he might try some simpler strategies in the early journeys, and 
then try more sophisticated ones later. MDS is simpler than MS, because it 
only care about the absolute difference between two squares. In journey 1, 
the first journey, the subject is very likely to try the simplest calculation 
strategy. As the experiment goes on, she or he might discover that the 
simple algorithm does not lead to good pay off, since the algorithm for the 
energy expenditure is not so simple. And then she or he adjust his or her 
strategy to care more about the actually energy expenditure for each 
possible step rather than the absolute difference between two squares. 
 
Compared with MDS, TDMS fits all the four journeys in all the four 
treatments better. As we said in the comparison between MS and TDMS, if 
a subject employs a myopic strategy, she or he is very likely to ignore the 
directions which are in the opposite of the destination. Thus it is not 
surprising that TDMS fits better than MDS. 
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Compared with TDMDS, TDMS fits all the journeys in treatment 4 worse, 
but fits all the journeys in the other three treatments better. The only 
difference between TDMS and TDMDS is that, TDMDS only cares about the 
absolute difference between two squares. But TDMS takes energy 
expenditure into account. As we have mentioned above, the subject is 
probably adjusting his or her strategy journey after journey. TDMS fits 
worse than TDMDS in journey 4 maybe because the subject is already tired 
of calculating after the three long journeys. And she or he goes back to the 
simple calculation strategy. 
 
And compared with TDMDS, MDS fits worse in all the journeys of all the 
treatments. The possible reason is very similar to the comparison of MS 
and TDMS: a myopic subject probably just ignores the directions which do 
not directly lead to the destination. 
 
All the four strategies are myopic, and only take the very immediate 
information into account. But from the analysis results, it is obvious that 
the myopic strategies cannot explain the entire subjects’ behaviour. The 
subject must have employed a more sophisticated strategy on at least 
some specific steps. 
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  J1 J2 J3 J4 
T1 TDMS TDMS TDMS TDMDS 
T2 TDMS TDMS TDMS TDMDS 
T3 TDMS TDMS TDMS TDMDS 
T4 TDMS TDMS TDMS TDMDS 
Table 1.10: Best Fitting Strategies across Journeys and Treatments 
 
  J1 J2 J3 J4 
T1 MS MDS MDS MDS 
T2 MS MDS MDS MDS 
T3 MS MDS MDS MDS 
T4 MS MDS MDS MDS 
Table 1.11: Worst Fitting Strategies across Journeys and Treatments 
 
1.5 Conclusion and Further Research 
1.5.1 Conclusion 
Our purpose is to investigate, without full information human behaviour in 
making a series of dynamic decisions. As is almost tautological, we can say 
that a rational person always tries to maximise his or her utility. An optimal 
strategy maximising utility can be worked out with full information. 
However, in the real world, information is not always sufficient. For 
example, theoretically, people can maximise their utility, given that they 
know the appropriate distribution of their income of every period in the 
future. In fact, people might have some rough ideas about their income of 
the very near future, but they cannot predict their income if the future is 
far away enough. Thus, in this situation, backward induction does not work. 
Nevertheless, given this constraint, rational people still want to maximise 
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their utility. Then they must have other strategies to try to solve this 
problem.  
 
We are interested in what people actually do. It is almost impossible to 
gather data from daily life. It is costly and inefficient to gather a series of 
decisions made by a specific person from the field. Even though it is 
possible, we cannot guarantee that we have gathered all the decisions the 
person made in this series, and all the information available when the 
decision was taken. Sometimes a decision might be implicit, and 
sometimes people might not be willing to report his or her every decision 
due to privacy or ethical issues. 
 
Thus we can only gather data from laboratory experiments. We have 
designed an experiment called “fog”, which retains all the characters of the 
situation we are interested in. In the experiment, the subject is required to 
travel across four maps one after one. These maps are divided into squares. 
She or he starts from a square, and can only move to those squares which 
shares bounds with his or her current square. A journey ends once she or 
he arrives at the “destination” square. The four journeys are independent 
of each other. At the start of each journey, the subject is endowed with 
some money. While travelling, she or he has to consume some energy for 
each step. The expenditure of energy is dependent on the height of his or 
her current position and the height of the square she or he is moving to. 
When she or he arrives at the destination, she or he receives the payoff, 
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which is the endowment minus the total energy consumed. In the 
experiment the subject could not receive a negative payoff; if the energy 
expenditure exceeded his or her endowment, the payoff is zero.  
 
If the subject knows all the heights of the squares on the map, an optimal 
route can be calculated by our algorithm. However, in order to mimic the 
fact that people cannot predict the future precisely, the subject does not 
know the exact height of all the squares on the map. In order to reflect that 
people might have some vague information in the very near future, a range 
is presented on those squares which are not far away from the subject. The 
true value of the height is uniformly distributed in the range. And if the 
square is far away from the current position enough, the subject can see 
nothing. 
 
We have four treatments in total. In all four treatments, the subject can 
see the exact height of the squares which share bounds with his or her 
current position. In treatment 1, the subject can see the height of the 
squares which are two squares away with range 20, and the height of the 
squares which are three squares away with range 50. In treatment 2, the 
subject can see the height of the squares which are two squares away with 
range 20, and cannot see anything if the square is further than that. In 
treatment 3, the subject can see the height of the squares which are two 
squares away with range 40, and the height of the squares which are three 
squares away with range 100. And in treatment 4, the subject can see the 
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height of the squares which are two squares away with range 40, and can 
see nothing if the square is further than that. 
 
We implemented this experiment twice. We recorded the subjects’ 
decision of moving to which square in each step. And based on these 
results, we have done some analyses. 
 
Four different strategies have been built to see which one can explain the 
subjects’ behaviour better. The first one is called the Myopic Strategy, in 
which the subject considers all four possible directions to move, but only 
one step away. She or he moves to the square with the least energy 
expenditure. The second one is called Two Direction Myopic Strategy, in 
which the subject considers only the directions which are towards the 
destination and only one step away as well. She or he moves to the square 
with the least energy expenditure and which is towards to the destination. 
The third is called Minimum Difference Strategy. It is similar to MS, but 
considers the absolute difference between two squares instead of the 
energy expenditure. And the fourth one is called Two Direction Minimum 
Difference Strategy. It is similar to TDMS, but considers the absolute 
difference instead of the energy expenditure as well. 
 
None of the four strategies can explain the subjects’ behaviour 100%. More 
precisely, on average, they can only explain about 65% of the subjects’ 
behaviour. And the percentage of the explanation varies across treatments 
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and journeys. The best fitting one is Two-Direction-Myopic Strategy for 
journey 2 in treatment 3, which explains 84.76% of the subjects’ behaviour. 
The worst fitting one is Minimum-Difference Strategy for journey 3 in 
treatment 2, which explains 45.51% of the subjects’ behaviour. It is 
obviously that subject do use some forward strategies to maximise his or 
her utility. And she or he is very likely to adjust their strategies map after 
map. 
1.5.2 Further Research 
All four strategies discussed in this chapter are under the hypothesis that 
the subject is myopic. She or he only takes the information on the squares 
which shares bounds with his or her current square into account. This kind 
of information is immediately available, and is accurate, since the height on 
these squares is not distorted by fog. We can say that this kind of 
information is cheap but with high quality. Putting heavy weight on such 
information can be regarded as a sort of wise choice based on rational 
considerations. 
 
However, the possible strategies are not restricted to these four. In the 
following we list some possible strategies that we are going to examine in 
the future. 
 
The first strategy is the Two Squared Sophisticated Strategy (TSS). In this 
strategy, the subject is assumed to be sophisticated. She or he takes not 
only the squares sharing bounds with the current square but also the 
squares two squares away from the current square into account. The 
expected height for the square with fog is the middle number of the range, 
since the true height of that square is equally distributed within the range. 
 
The second strategy is the All Information Sophisticated Strategy (AIS). In 
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this strategy, the subject takes all information into account. If the subject is 
in the treatments which they can only see two-squares away, the strategy 
is exactly same as the TSS. If the subject is in the treatments which they can 
see three squares away, they take the squares sharing boundary with the 
current square, the squares two squares away, and the squares three 
squares away into account.  
 
The third strategy is the Risk-Averse Strategy (RAS). In this strategy, the 
subject is assumed to be extremely risk-averse. She or he put heavy weight 
on the possible worst outcome, and thus chooses a path which will not 
lead to the undesirable outcome. 
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Chapter 2. Context Matters
1
 
2.1 Introduction 
Risk attitude is a crucial factor influencing economic behaviour. As a 
consequence, experimenters are interested in eliciting the risk-attitude of 
their subjects. This can be done in two ways: either directly, using the 
context of a particular experiment to estimate the risk-aversion that best 
explains behaviour; or indirectly, eliciting risk aversion in a separate part of 
the experiment, and using the elicited value to explain behaviour in the 
main experiment. This chapter is focused on the latter approach. 
 
Economic theory posits that decisions under risk depend on how people 
evaluate, and hence decide between, risky lotteries. By these we mean 
lotteries where the outcomes are risky, and where the probabilities are 
known. Clearly how people evaluate lotteries depends not only on the 
lotteries, but also on the preference functionals of the decision-maker 
(DM). In the literature there are a number of proposed preference 
functionals, the best-known of which is the Expected Utility functional. All 
of these embody the idea of an underlying utility function u(.); it is the 
degree of concavity of this when it is defined over money that indicates the 
degree of risk-aversion. It is this that we are trying to elicit. 
 
There are a number of methods that are used in the literature to elicit risk 
aversion. Possibly the most popular is that known as the Holt-Laury Price 
                                                 
1 This chapter is a joint work with John Hey, financially supported by Daniela Di Cagno. 
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List, introduced by Holt and Laury (2002), and which we will refer to as HL. 
While the detail may vary from application to application, the basic idea is 
simple: subjects are presented with an ordered list of pairwise choices and 
have to choose one of each pair. The list is ordered in that one of the two 
choices is steadily getting better or steadily getting worse as one goes 
through the list. There are many variants on the basic theme: sometimes 
one of the two choices is a certainty, and that is getting better or worse 
through the list; sometimes either just one or both of the choices are risky 
choices and one of them is getting better or worse through the list. 
Because of the ordered nature of the list, subjects should choose the 
option on one side up to a certain point thereafter choosing the option on 
the other side. Some experimenters force subjects to have a unique switch 
point; others leave it up to subjects. A rational subject never switches more 
than once, since one side of the list getting better or worse steadily. 
However, they may switch more than once due to an implementation 
error. Thus in our experiment, we force the subject to switch at most once. 
 
A second method is to give a set of Pairwise Choices, but separately (not in 
a list) and not ordered. We will refer to this as PC. Typically the pairwise 
choices are presented in a random order. This has been used by Hey and 
Orme (1996), amongst many others. Some argue that this method, whilst 
being similar to that of Price Lists, avoids some potential biases associated 
with ordered lists. Frequently the pairwise choices are chosen such that 
they are distributed randomly over one or more Marschak-Machina 
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triangles. Such a triangle is used to represent lotteries over a set of three 
outcomes. Two of the probabilities in the lotteries are plotted on the 
vertical and horizontal axes, while the third is the residual from one. The 
points at the vertices are certainties while points properly inside the 
triangle are lotteries. 
 
A method which is elegant from a theoretical point of the view is the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism proposed by Becker et al (1964). 
This we will later denote by LC (Lottery Choice) because of the way that we 
implement it. The method centres on eliciting the value to a subject of a 
lottery – if we know the value that a subject places on a lottery with 
monetary outcomes, we can deduce the individual’s attitude to risk over 
money. There are two variants of this mechanism that are used in the 
literature: one where the DM is told that they own the lottery, and hence 
have the right to play it out or to sell it; and one where the DM is offered 
the chance to buy the lottery, and, if so, to then play out the lottery. The 
subject’s valuation of the lottery as a potential seller is the minimum price 
for which they would be willing to sell it, while the subject’s valuation of 
the lottery as potential buyer is the maximum price for which they would 
be willing to buy it. Here we describe the mechanism as it relates to a 
potential buyer – the mechanism is the same, mutatis mutandis, if it relates 
to a potential buyer. The subject is asked to state a number; then a random 
device is activated, which produces a random number between the lowest 
amount in the lottery and the highest amount. If the random number is 
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less than the stated number, then the subject buys the lottery at a price 
equal to the random number (and then plays out the lottery); if the 
random number is greater, then nothing happens and the subject stays as 
he or she was. If2 the subject’s preference functional is the expected utility 
functional then it can be shown that this mechanism is incentive 
compatible and reveals the subject’s true evaluation of the lottery. The 
problem is that subjects do seem to have difficulty in understanding this 
mechanism, and a frequent criticism is that subjects understate their 
evaluation when acting as potential buyers and overstate it when acting as 
potential sellers. 
 
The Allocation method, which we shall denote by AL, was originally 
pioneered by Loomes (1991). It was then revived by Andreoni and Miller 
(2002) in a social choice context, and later by Choi et al. (2007) in a risky 
choice context. This method involves giving the subject some experimental 
money to allocate between various states of the world, with specified 
probabilities for the various states, and, in some implementations, with 
given exchange rates between experimental money and real money for 
each of the states. This method seems easier for subjects to understand 
than BDM. 
 
One clear difference between the methods is the information that the 
answers give. Pairwise Choices (on which Price Lists are built) merely tell us 
                                                 
2 Though this is not necessarily true with other preference functionals. 
98 
 
which of two lotteries is preferred, but not by how much. In contrast both 
the LC and AL give us a continuous measure, which is (should be) the 
outcome of an optimising decision. This suggests that the latter two might 
be more informative. A discussion of the various methods can be found in 
Charness et al (2013). Other methods are also discussed there, including 
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al 2002), the Gneezy and Potters 
method (Gneezy and Potter 1997) – which is close to our allocation method 
– and the Eckel and Grossman method (Eckel and Grossman 2002) – which 
is a generalisation of the Pairwise Choice method to a decision over several 
lotteries. This can be further extended by asking subjects to rank the 
various lotteries in the list. This has also been used by Carbone and Hey 
(1994), Bateman et al (2015) and Loomes and Pogrebna (2014). We call this 
the Ranking method. It can be considered a special – discretised – case of 
the allocation method. 
 
This chapter is a follow-up, and complement to, the paper by Loomes and 
Pogrebna (2014), in which the authors compare three of the elicitation 
methods described above – specifically Holt-Laury price lists, Ranking and 
Allocations. This chapter complements theirs, not only in the elicitation 
methods we consider, but also in that our experimental design (and 
crucially the numbers of problems asked for each method), as well as the 
data analysis, are completely different. We also consider a slightly different 
set of elicitation methods. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to report on the results of an experiment in 
which subjects were asked to perform each of the four methods described 
above. The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we describe 
how our experiment was organised and how the various methods were 
implemented in it, giving more detail about each of the methods. As we 
adopt an econometric methodology of fitting preference functionals to the 
data, we specify in section 3 the preference functionals that we fit to the 
data and describe the functional forms that we assume, and the 
parameters in them that we estimate. In section 4, we describe how we 
analysed the data, detailing the stochastic assumptions that we make. 
Section 5 contains the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.2 The Experimental Design and Implementation 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Our experiment was in four parts and different subjects took the parts in 
different orders. In total there are 24 different possible orders. Thus we 
had 24 subjects in each session to make sure that each order could be 
assigned to a subject. This design avoids the possibility of the experimental 
results being affected by a fixed presented order. Here we describe the 
four parts of the experiment. All parts of the experiment concerned 
lotteries. The complete set of tasks is attached in the appendices.  
 
Throughout the experiment, the lotteries are visually on the subjects’ 
computer screens in two dimensions, with the amount of money on the 
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vertical axis and the chances on the horizontal axis. This is a different 
presentation than that used by Loomes and Pogrebna (2014). Theirs is 
more appropriate in their setting; ours is more appropriate in ours as we 
wanted finer divisions (in steps of 0.01 rather than 0.1). 
 
If a particular lottery was chosen to pay out at the end of the experiment, 
the subject would draw a disk from a bag of 100 disks numbered from 1 to 
100. The subject was paid the amount of money corresponding to the 
number on the disk. Let us give an example. Take the lottery shown in 
Figure 2.1; this represents a lottery where there is a 1 in 50 chance of 
gaining £5 and a 1 in 50 chance of gaining £15. If this was played out at the 
end of the experiment, if the numbered disk was between 1 and 50 
inclusive, the subject was paid £5; if it was between 51 and 100 inclusive 
the subject was paid £15. One of the suggested advantages of this way of 
portraying lotteries is that the area of each bar on the graph indicates the 
expected value of the lottery. 
 
In the experiment, for each problem, the confirm button is not enabled 
until five seconds has elapsed. Forcing subjects to wait at least five seconds 
before they can make a decision somewhat reduces the possiblity that they 
are just clicking without thinking. 
 
At the end of the experiment, for each subject, one of the four parts is 
randomly selected to be real. And one problem is randomly selected from 
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that part to be played out. Different subjects are paid according to 
different problems in different parts. 
 
Figure 2.1: An Example of a Lottery in the Experiment 
 
 
2.2.2 Holt-Laury Price List (HL) 
The first part of the experiment presented a set of 48 Holt-Laury price lists, 
each containing 10 pairwise choices. In contrast, Loomes and Pogrebna 
(2014) had just 5 such lists. We used more because pre-experimental 
simulations indicated that to achieve accuracy in estimation we needed 
more. And we had a different objective to that of Loomes and Pogrebna 
(2014).  
 
For each list, the subject has to choose one lottery in each pair which she 
or he wishes to be played out. When all the ten pairwise choices in the list 
have been assigned a decision, a confirm button appears on the screen. 
Then the subject can submit the decision and proceed to the next problem. 
 
For each pair of lotteries, the left-hand side is always a risky lottery, and 
the right-hand side is always a certainty. Within a list, one side of the pairs 
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is fixed. The other side is changed gradually through the list in a specific 
pattern. For example, if the risky lottery is fixed in the list, the certainty is 
steadily getting better from the first pair to the last. And if the certainty is 
fixed, the risky lottery is steadily getting worse through the list. 
 
It is obvious to see that, in the list, the risky lottery higher up the list is 
always no worse than the risky lottery lower down; and the certainty lower 
down the list is always no worse than the certainty higher up. Thus, a 
rational subject switches at most once in a list. And the direction is always 
from a lottery to a certainty, if she or he switches at some point in the list. 
 
Making decisions in a list can be abstracted as choosing a switch point. Or 
we can say that a subject’s decisions reveal his or her certainty equivalence 
for a specific lottery. If she or he switches somewhere in a list, the certainty 
equivalence of the lottery is somewhere between the two pairwise choices 
that come just before and after the switch point. If the subject chooses all 
the lotteries in a list, it means that even the best certainty is not as good as 
the lottery, or even the worst lottery is not worse than the certainty. If the 
subject chooses all the certainties in a list, it means that even the worst 
certainty is better than the lottery, or even the best lottery is not better 
than the certainty. 
 
According to the nature of HL, we have no reason not to force a subject to 
switch at most once in a list. In the experiment, if a subject selects the 
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certainty in one pair of lotteries, the certainties in all the pairs after that 
pair are automatically selected. And similarly, if the lottery is selected in 
one pair, the lotteries in all the pairs after that pair are automatically 
selected. His kind of design can reduce the subject’s manual mistakes. And 
it can also free the subject from clicking the pairs one by one. 
 
An example is shown in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b; Figure 2.2a showing how it 
was first seen by the subject and Figure 2.2b showing it after its possible 
completion by a subject. These are screen shots from the experimental 
software; they appeared full-screen in the experimental interface. 
 
Figure 2.2a: Example of HL-1 
 
FIGURE 2.2b: Example of HL-2 
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Figure 2.2a gives an example of a Price List: in this example the thing that is 
staying constant is the lottery on the left (which is a 70% chance of £15 and 
a 30% chance of £0); the thing that is changing is that on the right – in this 
case a certainty – which increases from a certainty of £1.50 to a certainty 
of £15. Subjects were asked, for each pair in the list, to click on the 
preferred item; when doing so, the item on the other side turned grey. 
Figure 2.2b shows a possible set of responses – with the lottery being 
preferred until the certainty became £6. To avoid problems with subjects 
switching at several points within the list, the software forced subjects to 
choose a unique switching point. In contrast, Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) 
allowed subjects to switch at several points. But they write “the proportion 
of inconsistent participants in our data set ranged between 1.1% and 
5.6%”. It is not clear what to do with such subjects. 
 
The 48 Price Lists spanned a variety of cases; details are attached in the 
appendices. We denote this method HL.  
 
2.2.3 Pairwise Choices (PC) 
The second part asked subjects to respond to 80 pairwise choice problems. 
Again the problems were chosen after pre-experimental simulations. The 
objective was to get a set of problems which would enable us to identify 
accurately the preference functional and its parameters.  
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In each problem, subjects face a pair of lotteries. Sometimes they are both 
risky lotteries, and sometimes one of them is risky and the other is a 
certainty. Subjects have to decide which one they prefer to be played out. 
 
The decision-making implementation is straightforward. Subjects only need 
to click the “Left” or “Right” button. In order to avoid the situation where a 
subject’s decision is affected by the position of the lotteries presented, we 
randomized the two lotteries in a pair to be left or right. For example, in 
one problem, lottery A is on the left and lottery B is on the right for subject 
one. In the same problem for subject two, lottery A can be on the right and 
lottery B on the left. 
 
Figure 2.3: Example of PC 
 
An example is shown in Figure 2.3. In this pairwise choice, subjects had to 
choose between a lottery which give an 80% chance of £10 and a 20% 
chance of £5 and a lottery which gives a 40% chance of £15 and a 60% 
chance of £5. The set of 80 pairwise choice problems spanned lotteries 
with outcomes of £0, £5, £10 and £15 with probabilities of 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 
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0.8 and 1.0; details are attached in the appendices. We denote this method 
PC. 
 
2.2.4 Lottery Choices (LC) 
The third part asked subjects to respond to 54 Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
problems. Again, the problems were chosen after pre-experimental 
simulations. Typically, subjects are shown a lottery and asked to state their 
maximum willingness-to-pay or minimum willingness-to-accept for the 
lottery. Many experimenters have reported confusion among subjects in 
understanding this mechanism, so we adopted a new way of implementing 
it.  
 
Suppose that we want to find the subject’s certainty equivalent of a lottery 
which pays £x with probability p and £y with probability 1-p, where x>y. 
The subject is asked to choose a number £z. We want z to be the certainty 
equivalent. To obtain this in an incentive-compatible way3, we could tell 
the subjects that a random number Z will be generated from a uniform 
distribution over the interval (y,x) and that they will be paid Z if Z>z and will 
get to play out the lottery if Z≤z. The optimal choice of z is the subject’s 
certainty equivalent for the lottery. Consider the implications in terms of 
what they are choosing: their choice of z implies the choice of a lottery, 
which is a compound of the original lottery and the uniform distribution.  
 
                                                 
3 This works, as before, with Expected Utility preferences and may work with other preferences. 
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To illustrate this, consider the lottery in Figure 2.4a, where the payoffs are 
£5 and £15. If they state z=5 they get to play out the lottery; if they state 
z=15, they are opting for the lottery in Figure 2.4b – that is a uniform 
distribution over (5,15); if they state some number in between, they are 
opting for the lottery in Figure 2.4c. As z is varied from 5 to 15, the lottery 
in Figure 2.4c varies from that in Figure 2.4a to that in Figure 2.4b. We 
simply asked them to choose their preferred lottery; they did this by 
moving the slider below the graph and then clicking on ‘Confirm’. The 
implied value of z given by a choice of the lottery in Figure 2.4c is 11; this is 
the observed certainty equivalent.  
   
Figure 2.4a: Example for 
LC-1 
FIGURE 2.4b: Example for 
LC-2 
FIGURE 2.4c: Example for 
LC-3 
 
We feel that this is a clearer way of implementing the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. We denote it by LC – Lottery 
Choice – as they are choosing their preferred lottery. The 54 LC problems 
spanned lotteries with outcomes of £0, £5, £10 and £15 with probabilities 
ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1; details are attached in the 
appendices. 
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2.2.5 Allocation (AL) 
The fourth part asked subjects to respond to 81 allocation problems. 
Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) had just 13 problems, but theirs were over 
three states and the exchange rates were always 1 to 1. We adopted a 
two-way allocation with non-unitary exchange rates, partly because it is 
easier for subjects to understand, but more crucially because the 
econometric analysis of the data is simpler. The number of problems was 
again chosen after pre-experimental simulations. 
 
The subject is endowed with 100 tokens at the beginning of each problem. 
She or he has to split the endowment to two risky states, red and yellow, 
with given chances. For each state, there is an exchange rate between 
tokens and money. The exchange rate for red varies across problems. But 
the exchange rate for yellow is always equal to one. The chances assigned 
to red and yellow also vary across problems, but they always sum to 100. 
That is, if a problem is played out, the real state will be either red or 
yellow.  
 
An example is shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5: Example of AL 
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In this example, the two states (red and yellow) have probabilities 0.7 and 
0.3 respectively. Subjects have 100 tokens to allocate, and the exchange 
rates between tokens and money are 1 token = 17.5p for red, and 1 token 
= 10p for yellow. They made their allocation with the slider, with the figure 
showing the implied amounts of money (and their probabilities). There are 
three buttons below the bar to free the subject from moving the cursor. By 
clicking the buttons, the subject can allocate all the endowments to red or 
yellow, or split them equally. “Equal” here means the endowment is 
divided 50-50 between red and yellow. It does not mean that the monetary 
values of red and yellow are equal. The 81 allocation problems spanned 
probabilities ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1 with varying exchange 
rates; details are attached in the appendices. We denote this method AL. 
 
2.2.6 Experimental Implementation 
We implemented this experiment in four sessions during October and 
November 2014. The four sessions were all the same. There were 24 
subjects in each session. Each subject was assigned a specific order for the 
four elicitation methods, which was different from the order experienced 
by the other 23 subjects.  
 
Before the experiment, the subject was randomly allocated a specific 
integer between 1 and 24 by drawing a disk from an opaque bag. Then the 
subject was led to a desk with a number that matched the number on the 
disk she or he had drawn. On the desk, there was a computer and a piece 
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of colour-printed instructions. There was also a pen and blank sheets of 
paper for the subject to write or draw drafts during the experiment.  
 
Once all the subjects were seated, the experimenter briefly introduced the 
experiment. Then the subjects were given 15 minutes to read the 
instructions and to answer the control questions. During this time, the 
experimenter walked among the subjects and answered their questions 
privately. But the subjects were forbidden to talk to each other.  
 
The experimenter checked the answers to the control questions for every 
subject to make sure she or he understood the experiment. Once all the 
subjects had correct answers to the control questions and they had no 
further questions, the experiment was started. There was a “Start” button 
showing on each subject’s computer screen after the experimenter had 
changed a value on the central computer. The subjects clicked the button 
and started the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, the subjects could not communicate with anyone 
else. If they had any questions, they put up their hands or went to the 
control room. The experimenter would answer their questions privately. 
 
Once a subject had finished the experiment, she or he had to notify the 
experimenter. Then the subject was taken to a separate room and was paid 
there. Since there were four elicitation methods, the subject had to 
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randomly draw a disk from four in an opaque bag. The number on the disk 
denoted which elicitation method would be played out. For the numbers 
on the four disks, one to four denotes AL, LC, PC, and HL respectively. 
 
There were four separate bags prepared for the four different methods. 
The number of disks in the bags matched the number of problems in each 
method. Once the played-out method had been determined, the subject 
randomly drew a disk from the corresponding bag to decide which problem 
was going to be played out.  
 
This information and the subject’s number was input into a “replay” 
project, and then the subject’s decision on that specific problem was 
shown on the screen. Then the subject was asked to randomly draw a disk 
from an opaque bag. There was an integer from 1 to 100 on the disk 
denoting the real state which is played out for the problem. The subject’s 
payoff depended on his or her decision and the real state played out. She 
or he also received a show-up fee, which was £2.50. 
 
2.3 Functional forms assumed 
While we are primarily interested in the differences between the different 
elicitation methods, in order to understand these differences we need to 
model behaviour and hence estimate the attitude to risk. To model the 
behaviour, we4 need to choose preference functionals. We do not know 
                                                 
4 By this we mean when using our methodology; that of Loomes and Pogrebna differs. We shall 
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the preference functionals of our subjects, so we have to choose a set of 
such functionals and use our data to find the best-fitting one(s). We chose 
the most popular in the literature, namely Expected Utility (EU) and Rank 
Dependent expected utility (RD).  
 
Under the EU hypothesis, the utility of a lottery is simply the sum of the 
products of the probabilities and the utility of the possible outcomes 
respectively. A person simply perceives the probabilities as they are stated 
in the lottery. Or, in other words, a person assigns the same weight to all 
the probabilities. That weight is one. 
 
Under the RD hypothesis, people are assumed to attach non-unitary 
weights to (de-)cumulative probabilities. A low probability is likely to be 
over-weighted, while a high probability is likely to be under-weighted. The 
weight assigned to a specific probability also depends on the amount of the 
related outcome and all the other possible outcomes in the lottery. RD can 
be regarded as a generalized form of EU. EU is the special case of RD in 
which all the weights are equal to one. Below is a mathematical illustration 
of EU and RD. 
 
Let us denote by V the value to a subject of a 3-outcome lottery which pays 
xi with probability pi (for i=1,2,3), and let us order the payoffs so that x1 ≥ x2 
≥ x3, then we have  
                                                                                                                            
discuss these methodological differences later. 
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for EU: u(V) = p1u(x1) + p2u(x2) + p3u(x3) 
for RD: u(V) = w(p1)u(x1) + [w(p1+p2)-w(p1)]u(x2) + [1-w(p1+p2)]p3u(x3) 
In these expressions, u(.) is the underlying utility function of the subject 
and w(.) is the rank-dependent weighting function. 
 
We need to specify the utility function u(.) which appears in both these 
functionals. We adopt both the constant Relative Risk aversion (RR) form 
and the constant Absolute Risk aversion (AR) form. These are given by: 
 for RR: u(x) = x1-r/(1-r),  r≠1; ln(x), r=1 
 for AR: u(x) = -exp(-rx), r≠0; x, r=0. 
Here risk aversion measures the degree of reluctance of a person to accept 
a risky lottery rather than a certainty. If a person is more risk-averse, she or 
he is more likely to accept a certainty rather than a risky lottery, even when 
the expected value of the lottery is greater than the certainty. Or, in other 
words, to a risk-averse person, a risky lottery brings utility less than a 
certainty which is equal to the expected payoff. 
 
We note that in both cases r=0 corresponds to risk-neutrality and increases 
in r imply greater risk aversion, but there is no mapping between the r for 
RR and that for AR. This is because the r in RR is a measure of relative risk 
aversion, while the r in AR is a measure of absolute risk aversion. 
 
In fitting the RD specifications, we also need to specify a weighting function 
for the probabilities. This we take to be of the Quiggin form 
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 w(p) = pg/[pg+(1-p)g]1/g 
In the results that follow, for all four elicitation methods, we fit the four 
possible combinations of the two preference functionals and the two utility 
functions, using the obvious notation RREU, RRRD, AREU and ARRD. 
Essentially we want to see which of these best explains the data and we 
also want to see whether the estimated parameters differ across the 
elicitation methods; we do this on a subject-by-subject basis, as it is clear 
that subjects are different. 
 
2.4 Our stochastic assumptions and econometric methodology 
We should comment on our econometric methodology, and contrast it to 
that used by others. We treat subjects as different, so we analyse 
subject-by-subject5.  We also use simultaneously all the responses of the 
subjects on all problems of a particular elicitation method (and use them 
for estimation), rather than compare responses on particular problems. 
The latter is what Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) and many others have 
done. So, for example, in their Table 1 on their page 578, they look at the 
distribution of responses6 for particular decision tasks and compare these 
distributions across tasks. They note that the distributions are different 
across tasks, sometimes significantly so. This could be the case because of 
noise in subjects’ responses but they present no way of modelling this 
                                                 
5 We could fit a mixture model to the data, thus estimating distributions of the relevant parameters 
over all subjects. 
6 Which imply particular levels of risk-aversion. 
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noise, though the use of a statistical test (in this case a Mann-Whitney test) 
does necessarily involve some implicit assumption about stochastics. 
 
Why we prefer our approach is because of inference and statistical 
considerations. We can illustrate this very simply: suppose we wish to test 
an hypothesis that μ1 = μ2 = μ3 where these are means of some variable(s) 
across some population(s) and we base our test on sample means m1, m2 
and m3. Testing separately whether m1 is significantly different from m2, 
that m2 is significantly different from m3 and that m3 is significantly 
different from m1 is not the same as testing whether m1, m2 and m3 are 
significantly different from each other. For given levels of significance, the 
power is different. Another difference between our methodology as 
compared to others’ is in the number of problems we present to our 
subjects: pre-experimental simulations show that one needs large numbers 
of observations to get precise estimates; there is a lot of noise in subjects’ 
behaviour. 
 
Our econometric methodology is to fit, for each of RREU, RRRD, AREU and 
ARRD, the models to the decisions of the subjects, for each of the four 
elicitation methods, and hence obtain estimates of the risk aversion index 
(and also the other parameters). We do this by maximum likelihood, using 
MATLAB. To do this we need to make assumptions about the stochastic 
nature of the data. This arises from errors made by the subjects. We largely 
follow convention.  
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 HL: we assume that the subject calculates the utility difference 
between the two lotteries for each pair in the list, but makes an 
error in the calculation. Further, embodying the fact that the list is 
presented as a list, we assume that the subject makes the same 
error for each pair; we further assume that this error has a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and precision (the inverse of the standard 
deviation) s. Then the switch-point decision is taken on the basis of 
where this utility difference plus error changes from positive to 
negative or vice versa. 
 PC: we assume that on each problem the subject calculates the 
utility difference between the two lotteries, but makes an error in 
this calculation; we further assume that this error is independent 
across problems and has a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
precision (the inverse of the standard deviation) s. So that the 
decision is taken on the basis of the sign of the correct utility 
difference plus error. 
 LC: we assume that the subject calculates the certainty equivalent 
of the lottery, but makes an error in this calculation; we further 
assume that this error has a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
precision (the inverse of the standard deviation) s. So that the 
observed certainty equivalent is the correct subject’s true 
equivalent plus error. 
 AL: we assume that the subject calculates the optimal allocation 
that he or should make, but makes an error in this calculation; we 
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further assume that this error has a normal distribution with mean 
0 and precision (the inverse of the standard deviation) s. So that the 
observed allocation is the optimal allocation plus error. 
 
We note that the s in the PL and PC stories are on a different scale than the 
s in the PC and AL stories – the former being on utilities and the latter on 
money. 
 
2.5 Results 
We had 96 subjects, who each completed all four parts of the experiment. 
For each subject and for each elicitation method, we attempted to fit the 
four models RREU, RRRD, AREU and ARRD to their decisions; so for each 
subject 16 models were estimated more details for estimation. This implies 
a total of 1,536 estimations. In certain cases the estimation did not 
converge. This was for a variety of reasons which we discuss below. In the 
table below we enumerate these cases by elicitation method. It will be 
seen from this table that the ‘worst offender’ is PC.  There were a total of 
20 subjects where convergence was not obtained on at least one method. 
As the point of the chapter is to compare different elicitation methods, we 
exclude all these 20 subjects from the analysis that follows (though an 
online appendix repeats parts of the analyses with all 96 subjects).  
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Method(s) Number of times not converged 
Just LC 3 
Just PC 9 
Just HL 5 
Both AL and LC 1 
Both AL and PC 1 
Both LC and PC 1 
 
These cases of non-convergence took several forms: (1) where the subject 
was clearly either risk-neutral or risk-loving – in which cases the implied 
parameters are not unique; (2) where the estimation hit the bounds 
imposed by us on the parameters; (3) where the subject appeared not to 
understand the tasks, or where the subject appeared to be responding 
randomly. 
 
Regarding the bounds, the problematic parameter was often the g in the 
probability weighting function for RD. We imposed a lower limit of 0.3. 
Below that the weighting function is not monotonically increasing, and an 
upper limit which varied from subject to subject.   
 
We present our results in two main parts. First we present some summary 
statistics; these are in Table 2.1. Then we compare the elicited/estimated 
parameters across preference functionals for given elicitation methods; 
finally we compare the elicited/estimated parameters across elicitation 
methods for given preference functionals.   
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Table 2.1 presents some summary statistics. It is very clear from this that 
the estimated parameters vary widely across the different elicitation 
methods. For example, using AL the risk-aversion index elicited in the RR 
specifications is, on average, much higher that found with the other 
methods, and also has a much higher spread. It may well be that the 
elicitation method is affecting the way that subjects process the problems. 
For example the allocation method may be focussing subjects’ minds on 
what outcome they might obtain for different states of the world. And here 
we have to emphasize that, the r value for the RR specifications cannot be 
compared with the r value for the AR specifications. 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Stats Method 
RREU RRRD AREU ARRD 
r s r g s r s r g s 
Mean 
PC 0.502 1.666 0.375 1.105 2.135 0.175 0.127 0.134 1.112 0.164 
AL 3.144 0.161 2.059 1.120 0.168 0.078 0.148 0.052 1.021 0.151 
LC 0.192 0.594 0.028 0.959 0.635 0.094 0.564 0.043 1.027 0.598 
HL 0.182 0.955 -0.022 0.824 0.963 0.068 0.110 0.026 0.741 0.136 
Median 
PC 0.535 1.358 0.399 0.850 1.515 0.157 0.111 0.109 0.870 0.137 
AL 1.054 0.078 0.947 1.005 0.087 0.027 0.068 0.024 0.924 0.070 
LC 0.329 0.539 0.237 0.907 0.580 0.073 0.530 0.041 0.904 0.549 
HL 0.174 0.777 0.004 0.648 0.748 0.044 0.097 0.018 0.646 0.121 
Standard Deviation 
PC 0.275 1.440 0.320 0.714 2.998 0.131 0.077 0.154 0.701 0.131 
AL 10.367 0.646 8.450 0.428 0.655 0.231 0.661 0.186 0.403 0.667 
LC 0.956 0.193 1.092 0.401 0.192 0.189 0.164 0.183 0.535 0.166 
HL 0.285 1.136 0.308 0.622 1.240 0.089 0.144 0.087 0.314 0.149 
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The parameters of the various specifications are the risk-aversion index r 
(for both the EU and the RD functionals), the weighting function parameter 
g (for the RD functional) and the precision parameter s for all functionals. 
Some of these parameters are comparable, and in Table 2.2.1 we show the 
relationships between them for those that are comparable. We can 
compare g across RRRD and ARRD, and similarly we can compare s across 
the various preference functionals. Also we can compare the r between 
RREU and RRRD, and between AREU and ARRD, though clearly if the true 
preference functional is Rank Dependent then assuming Expected Utility 
preferences may lead to bias. Table 2.2.1 reports the correlation (ρ) 
between the estimated parameters for different elicitation methods and 
the intercept (α) and slope (β) of a linear regression of one against the 
other; if they were consistently producing the same estimates then α 
should be zero and β should be one. The table shows that the estimated 
values of s, across preference functionals, are generally not too far apart. 
For example, the estimated values of s (the precision parameter) using the 
AL method are very close whether we fit RREU or RRRD. This is less true for 
the estimated values of g (the weighting function parameter), though they 
are very similar using the LC method whether we fit RRRD or ARRD. 
However this is not always the case: for example, there are big differences 
between the estimated values of g using the PC method depending on 
whether we fit RRRD or ARRD. The estimated r values differ more markedly 
across the elicitation methods, though once again there are cases (using LC 
and comparing RREU and RRRD) where the fit is good. Even though it is 
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difficult to summarise a whole table in one sentence, one could say that 
the correlations are all positive and reasonably large, and certainly larger 
than in Table 2.3 (comparisons across elicitation methods), which we shall 
come to shortly.  
Parameter Method x y α β ρ 
r PC RREU RRRD -0.121*** 0.988 0.849 
r PC AREU ARRD -0.048*** 1.035 0.875 
s PC RREU RRRD 0.538*** 0.789*** 0.795 
s PC AREU ARRD 0.046*** 0.844*** 0.879 
g PC RRRD ARRD 0.624*** 0.442*** 0.451 
r AL RREU RRRD 0.185** 0.639*** 0.801 
r AL AREU ARRD 0.009*** 0.528*** 0.700 
s AL RREU RRRD 0.001 1.058*** 0.987 
s AL AREU ARRD -0.001 1.037*** 0.997 
g AL RRRD ARRD 0.373*** 0.579*** 0.617 
r LC RREU RRRD -0.179*** 1.082 0.923 
r LC AREU ARRD -0.040*** 0.884** 0.913 
s LC RREU RRRD 0.078*** 0.938 0.941 
s LC AREU ARRD 0.055** 0.963 0.950 
g LC RRRD ARRD 0.095 0.975 0.731 
r HL RREU RRRD -0.174*** 0.835** 0.773 
r HL AREU ARRD -0.030*** 0.829*** 0.848 
s HL RREU RRRD -0.111* 1.139** 0.890 
s HL AREU ARRD 0.008 1.210** 0.847 
g HL RRRD ARRD 0.421*** 0.388*** 0.769 
The hypotheses being tested are α=0 and β=1. 
* denotes significantly different at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Table 2.2.1: A comparison of the estimated coefficients across Preference Functionals 
(part 1) 
 
Some of the parameters are not comparable. Crucially the r parameter 
differs in both what it measures and its scale between the Constant 
Absolute Risk Aversion specification and the Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion specification; moreover there is no precise mapping between 
them. However increases in either imply a higher risk-aversion so that they 
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should be positively related. Table 2.2.2 shows the results. Again the 
correlations are reasonably high. 
 
We can also show the results graphically. We show here just a subset ‒ the 
full set can be found in the appendices. Figure 2.6 shows the scatter of the 
estimated r values using the AL method across preference functionals. This 
figure suggests that getting the functional form wrong does not upset our 
estimation of the risk-aversion of the subjects. (Deck et al (2008) also 
present such scatters and make the same point, though their risk-aversion 
indices are not estimated.) However, Figure 2.7 suggests that if we get the 
utility function wrong then the estimate of the probability weighting 
parameter g may be quite seriously wrong.  
 
Figure 2.8 shows the scatter of the estimated s values using the AL method 
across the preference functionals. The relationships are almost always the 
45 degree line (as Table 2.2.1 shows). This means that if whether we 
assume RR or AR preferences we get almost the same estimate of the noise 
in subjects’ responses. 
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Parameter Method x y α β ρ 
r PC RREU AREU -0.036** 0.422*** 0.889 
r PC RREU ARRD -0.073*** 0.410*** 0.731 
r PC RRRD AREU 0.056*** 0.318*** 0.779 
r PC RRRD ARRD -0.009 0.380*** 0.788 
s PC RREU AREU 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.816 
s PC RREU ARRD 0.084*** 0.043*** 0.637 
s PC RRRD AREU 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.622 
s PC RRRD ARRD 0.074*** 0.043*** 0.678 
r AL RREU AREU 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.979 
r AL RREU ARRD 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.746 
r AL RRRD AREU 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.724 
r AL RRRD ARRD 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.968 
s AL RREU AREU 0.002 0.809*** 0.901 
s AL RREU ARRD 0.002 0.834 *** 0.893 
s AL RRRD AREU 0.004 0.732 *** 0.873 
s AL RRRD ARRD 0.004 0.759 *** 0.872 
r LC RREU AREU 0.026** 0.260*** 0.880 
r LC RREU ARRD -0.022* 0.247*** 0.857 
r LC RRRD AREU 0.090*** 0.137*** 0.790 
r LC RRRD ARRD 0.039*** 0.143*** 0.851 
s LC RREU AREU 0.208*** 0.600*** 0.705 
s LC RREU ARRD 0.286*** 0.525*** 0.609 
s LC RRRD AREU 0.202*** 0.571*** 0.668 
s LC RRRD ARRD 0.229*** 0.581*** 0.671 
r HL RREU AREU 0.019*** 0.267*** 0.857 
r HL RREU ARRD -0.016** 0.231*** 0.757 
r HL RRRD AREU 0.072*** 0.204*** 0.706 
r HL RRRD ARRD 0.031*** 0.228*** 0.806 
s HL RREU AREU 0.033*** 0.070*** 0.723 
s HL RREU ARRD 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.618 
s HL RRRD AREU 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.638 
s HL RRRD ARRD 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.648 
The hypotheses being tested are α=0 and β=0. 
* denotes significantly different at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Table 2.2.2: A comparison of the estimated coefficients across Preference Functionals 
(part 2) 
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Figure 2.6: estimates of r using AL across preference functionals 
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Figure 2.7: estimates of g across preference functional
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Figure 2.8: estimates of s using AL across preference functionals 
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We continue to analyse the different elicitation methods across preference 
functionals, and now consider those where the estimated parameters are 
not comparable. Table 2.2.2 gives details. Here we include the estimated 
intercept and slope of the regression of an estimated parameter using a 
particular elicitation method for each preference functional against each of 
the others. Because of the lack of a relationship between the two 
parameters, other than monotonic increasingness, the obvious test to carry 
out is that the slope is positive; significance is good and this is reported in 
the β column. We also include a test of whether the intercept is 
significantly different from 0 – as it should be. Here significance is weak. 
 
Finally, and crucially, we compare the estimated parameters across 
elicitation methods. Table 2.3 gives a summary, while Figures 2.9 to 2.12 
present a subset of graphical comparisons; the full set of 10 sets of 
comparisons can be found in the appendices. Let us start with Figure 2.9 
which shows the 6 scatters for the estimated r value for the RRRD 
functional; each scatter being the estimated values using one elicitation 
method plotted against the estimated values for another elicitation 
method, for all the non-excluded subjects. For example, the scatter at the 
top left compares AL with LC. In a perfect world these points would lie on 
the 45o line. As the scales on the two axes differ, it helps to fit a regression 
line to the scatter. Table 2.3 gives the intercept (-0.013) and slope (0.224) 
of this line. While the intercept is not significantly different from zero, the 
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slope is significantly different from one, as the asterisks indicate. As can be 
seen, the risk-aversion index elicited by AL is generally greater than that 
elicited by LC. This could result from what might be called a built-in bias 
with the allocation method – subjects tend to make allocations to avoid 
large differences in their payoff depending on which state occurs, while the 
‘BDM’ mechanism does not make so explicit the possible consequences of 
their actions. Indeed generally the risk-aversion elicited under allocation is 
generally higher than for the other three methods. 
Parameter PF x y α β ρ 
r RREU AL LC -0.013 0.224*** 0.417 
r RREU AL PC 0.484*** 0.022*** 0.073 
r RREU AL HL 0.003 0.132*** 0.417 
r RREU LC PC 0.471*** 0.098*** 0.197 
r RREU LC HL 0.113*** 0.253*** 0.507 
r RREU PC HL 0.163** 0.038*** 0.037 
s RREU AL LC 0.566*** 0.240 0.056 
s RREU AL PC 1.589*** -2.760* -0.157 
s RREU AL HL 0.554*** 2.583 0.281 
s RREU LC PC 1.674*** -0.549*** -0.126 
s RREU LC HL 0.473*** 0.517** 0.252 
s RREU PC HL 0.900*** -0.074*** -0.147 
r RRRD AL LC -0.230** 0.340*** 0.426 
r RRRD AL PC 0.334*** 0.046*** 0.101 
r RRRD AL HL -0.194*** 0.161*** 0.377 
r RRRD LC PC 0.366*** 0.060*** 0.122 
r RRRD LC HL -0.045 0.193*** 0.412 
r RRRD PC HL -0.071 0.129*** 0.134 
s RRRD AL LC 0.620*** 0.089* 0.022 
s RRRD AL PC 2.067*** -3.640* -0.157 
s RRRD AL HL 0.445*** 3.518** 0.322 
s RRRD LC PC 1.036** 1.080 
 
0.196 
s RRRD LC HL 0.424** 0.557 
 
0.212 
s RRRD PC HL 0.822*** -0.014*** -0.030 
g RRRD AL LC 0.916*** 0.045*** 0.048 
g RRRD AL PC 0.706*** 0.365*** 0.220 
g RRRD AL HL 0.602*** 0.200*** 0.138 
g RRRD LC PC 1.075*** 0.030*** 0.017 
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g RRRD LC HL 0.764*** 0.062*** 0.040 
g RRRD PC HL 0.767*** 0.052*** 0.059 
r AREU AL LC -0.040 3.693*** 0.391 
r AREU AL PC 0.171*** 0.276 0.039 
r AREU AL HL -0.007 2.232** 0.468 
r AREU LC PC 0.159*** 0.174*** 0.252 
r AREU LC HL 0.042*** 0.279*** 0.592 
r AREU PC HL 0.064*** 0.020*** 0.029 
s AREU AL LC 0.493*** 0.982 0.228 
s AREU AL PC 0.124*** 0.032*** 0.016 
s AREU AL HL 0.097*** -0.124*** -0.124 
s AREU LC PC 0.161*** -0.061*** -0.130 
s AREU LC HL 0.027* 0.107*** 0.460 
s AREU PC HL 0.104*** -0.122*** -0.249 
r ARRD AL LC -0.098*** 4.694*** 0.415 
r ARRD AL PC 0.121*** 0.656 0.060 
r ARRD AL HL -0.038* 2.369** 0.377 
r ARRD LC PC 0.129*** 0.108*** 0.128 
r ARRD LC HL 0.017* 0.200*** 0.420 
r ARRD PC HL 0.026* -0.001*** -0.002 
s ARRD AL LC 0.531*** 0.911 0.217 
s ARRD AL PC 0.149*** 0.020*** 0.011 
s ARRD AL HL 0.114*** -0.001*** -0.001 
s ARRD LC PC 0.173*** -0.037*** -0.085 
s ARRD LC HL 0.034 0.134*** 0.409 
s ARRD PC HL 0.137*** -0.153*** -0.201 
g ARRD AL LC 0.928*** 0.104*** 0.078 
g ARRD AL PC 1.078*** 0.042*** 0.024 
g ARRD AL HL 0.665*** 0.065*** 0.084 
g ARRD LC PC 1.132*** -0.019*** -0.015 
g ARRD LC HL 0.612*** 0.115*** 0.196 
g ARRD PC HL 0.720*** 0.010*** 0.021 
The hypotheses being tested are α=0 and β=1. 
* denotes significantly different at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Table 2.3: A comparison of the estimated coefficients across Elicitation Method 
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Figure 2.9: estimates of r in RRRD across elicitation methods 
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Figure 2.10: estimates of r in AREU across elicitation methods 
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Figure 2.11: estimates of s in RRRD across elicitation method 
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Figure 2.12: estimates of g in RRRD across elicitation methods 
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Relative to the other comparisons, the one discussed above is one of the 
best. Examine Figure 2.10 which shows the 6 scatters for the estimated r 
value for the AREU functional. Here, as Table 2.3 shows, most of the 
intercept values are significantly different from zero and most of the slope 
values from 1, so the different elicitation methods are getting usually 
significantly different estimates. Once again the allocation method seems 
to be inducing more risk-averse behaviour. Figure 2.11, comparing 
different estimates of the precision parameter s for RRRD across the 
different methods, shows that sometimes the relationship is negative. Here 
the precision seems to be lower with the allocation method, and possibly 
highest on the Pairwise Choice method, though a direct comparison does 
not make much sense as the error on PC is on the utility difference 
(between the two lotteries) while the error on AL is on the difference in the 
amounts of implied money. 
 
Figure 2.12 is arguably the worst, usually showing very little relationship 
(and sometimes a negative one) between the elicited g values. Here the g 
value for the LC method seems to have the largest variation in the 
estimated values and that for PC having the smallest. 
 
Finally, even though the different elicitation methods seem to disagree on 
the estimates of the parameters, we should ask whether at least they 
agree on the best-fitting preference functional. Table 2.4 gives the results, 
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with the criterion for the ‘best-fitting’ functional being either the raw 
log-likelihood, or either the Akaike or Bayes information criterion (both of 
which correct the log-likelihood for the number of parameters involved in 
the fitting). Table 2.4 shows that correcting for degrees of freedom does 
make a big difference. But here again, the different elicitation methods 
disagree: it is clear that AL puts the AR specifications first, while the other 
methods suggest that RR fits better. Moreover there is no general 
agreement as to which of EU and RD is the best. 
Method PF LL BIC AIC 
PC 
RREU 1 25 33 
RRRD 38 20 12 
AREU 1 10 14 
ARRD 37 21 17 
AL 
RREU 1 0 1 
RRRD 74 2 2 
AREU 0 24 37 
ARRD 2 50 36 
LC 
RREU 2 14 18 
RRRD 49 14 12 
AREU 0 17 22 
ARRD 27 31 24 
HL 
RREU 1 40 40 
RRRD 49 6 6 
AREU 0 19 22 
ARRD 27 11 8 
Table 2.4: Best-fitting preference functional 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
One clear conclusion that emerges from our results is that the elicitation 
method ‒ the context ‒ does matter to the estimated risk-aversion index; 
there are big differences in the estimated risk attitudes across the 
137 
 
elicitation methods. The choice of the preference functional seems to be 
less important, though if the best functional is RD then assuming it to be 
EU can lead to mis-elicitation. The choice of the utility function seems to be 
even less important. 
 
This seems to send a clear message: risk-aversion should be elicited in the 
context in which it is to be interpreted. This suggests that one should 
estimate the risk-aversion index along with the other parameters of the 
model being fitted to the data; eliciting them in another context could lead 
to mis-interpretations of the data. As Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) write 
“In the short run, one recommendation is that researchers who wish to 
take some account of and/or make some adjustment for risk attitude in 
their studies should take care to pick an elicitation procedure as similar as 
possible to the type of decision they are studying…”. We would even go as 
far by suggesting modifying “as similar as possible” to “in the same decision 
problem”. They follow up with a comment about the number of tasks that 
are posed to subjects; often, given the noise in subjects’ responses, there 
are far too few. We would not go as one experiment which asked 2400 
pairwise choice problems (over two sessions) but 1 or 2 is surely too few 
even if we want to elicit just 1 or 2 parameters. 
 
In summary, our results suggest something particularly worrying: namely, 
that subjects do not have a stable preference functional for making 
decisions under risk. This conclusion would undermine much of economics. 
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To check whether that is true we could investigate more carefully the 
stochastic component of decision-making. Or we could take up Loomes and 
Pogrebna’s call to understand better “how contextual or procedural factors 
interact with that process [of decision-making].” Context does seem to 
matter, though it is not clear whether this is because of cognitive factors or 
because of error.
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Chapter 3. Do Past Decisions Influence 
Future Decisions?1 
3.1 Introduction  
In many, if not most, experiments on individual choice, the Random Lottery 
Incentive (RLI) mechanism is used. This involves each subject being asked a 
number of questions, one of which is chosen at random at the end of the 
experiment, with the payoff to the subject being determined by the 
subject’s response on that question. A rather superficial reason for the use 
of this mechanism is that it can appear to save the experimenter money 
while making the payoffs appear salient to the subjects, but the real reason 
is that it avoids income effects and cross-task contamination. 
 
However, as pointed out by Holt (1986) and others, this requires the 
separation by the subject of the various questions. If the subject has 
Expected Utility (EU) preferences, this is guaranteed through the 
Independence Axiom, but if the preferences are not EU, there is a potential 
inconsistency in the use of the RLI mechanism. This can be illustrated very 
simply, though rather artificially, with the following example. Suppose a 
subject is asked to choose between (L) £4 with certainty and (R) a 50-50 
gamble between £10 and £0. Suppose that the subject is sufficiently 
risk-averse that L is preferred. However, now suppose that the subject is 
offered the same choice twice and is told that his or her answer on a 
                                                 
1 This chapter is a joint work with John Hey and has been published in Applied Economics Letters, 
21:3, 152-157, 2013. 
140 
 
randomly-chosen one of the two choices will be played out for real. Having 
chosen L on the first occasion, the subject may argue as follows: “if I 
choose L again on the second choice, I will get £4 for certain, but if I choose 
R, I will get £4 with probability ½, £10 with probability ¼ and £0 with 
probability ¼”. Obviously if the subject has EU preferences the subject will 
choose L again, but if the preferences are not EU the subject could prefer R. 
So the subject may choose L the first time, and R the second: hence, when 
making inferences from the data, the experimenter needs to take into 
account whether the subject separates or not. 
 
While independence is sufficient for separation, it is not necessary: 
subjects could have non-EU preferences and still separate – making the RLI 
mechanism still valid. It is therefore an empirical issue. Not surprisingly, it 
has already been investigated. The main studies are Starmer and Sugden 
(1991), Cubitt et al (1998), Hey and Lee (2005a) and Hey and Lee (2005b).2 
The first two of these take a very simple experimental setting in which 
subjects were presented with at most two questions, and the focus was on 
whether there was cross-question contamination. The conclusion was that 
there was not, and hence that the RLI was valid. However, in many 
experiments subjects are presented with many more than two questions 
(on the grounds that, because of the presence of noise in subjects’ 
behaviour, many observations are needed to elicit preferences accurately). 
This was the setting for the two Hey and Lee papers, and the hypotheses 
                                                 
2 Lee (2008) is also relevant. 
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being tested there were: (1) that the subjects, in answering each question, 
considered the experiment as a whole; (2) that in answering any question, 
subjects took into account their answers to all the preceding questions. 
Once again, the conclusions were that they did not, and hence that the RLI 
was valid. 
 
However that is not the end of the story. Wakker 3  writes: “The 
random-lottery incentive system has since become the almost exclusively 
used incentive system for individual choice. Unfortunately, more than half 
of the referees of economic journals will embark on yet another discussion 
from scratch of this issue.” He also points to the evidence discussed above.  
The problem is that not all of the various possible forms of contamination 
have been investigated. In particular, in experiments with many questions, 
the two hypotheses considered by Hey and Lee are cognitively very 
demanding and hence possibly unrealistic. Something simpler might be 
cognitively more plausible. This is what we test here: we test the 
hypothesis that in answering any question the subject takes into account 
their decision on the immediately preceding question. We call this the 
Contamination Hypothesis, to distinguish it from the usual Separation 
Hypothesis. Under our hypothesis any decision is affected by all previous 
decisions, not directly as in Hey and Lee, but indirectly through the 
immediately preceding one. 
                                                 
3 http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/miscella/debates/randomlinc.htm 
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3.2 The hypothesis and the data 
We suppose that every subject faces N decisions in one experiment 
(n=1,2,…,N). The N decisions are presented sequentially. In each decision, 
the subject has to choose between two lotteries, Left (L) and Right (R). The 
nth decision is denoted by dn. Our Contamination Hypothesis clearly does 
not apply to the first decision since there is no previous decision. However 
on decision n (n>1) the subject may be affected by dn-1. We measure such 
an effect with a parameter α and we hypothesise that he or she weighs the 
present decision with α (0≤α≤1), and the previous decision with (1-α).  
Hence our hypothesis assumes that the subject is thinking that he or she is 
facing a choice between [dn-1,(1-α);Ln,α] and  [dn-1,(1-α);Rn,α] instead of a 
choice between Ln and Rn (where [a,pa;b,pb] denotes a lottery which yields 
a with probability pa and b with probability pb). We interpret α as a 
behavioural parameter, indicating the weight that the subject attaches to 
the previous decision when taking the present decision. Note that if α takes 
the value 1 then the subject separates completely.  
 
We should emphasise that under this hypothesis, there is contamination of 
any decision by all previous decisions – but the contamination is indirect 
(through the previous decision, which, in turn is contaminated by the one 
before that, and so on) and not direct, as in Hey and Lee. 
 
We use the data from Hey (2001). In that experiment there were 53 
subjects; they were asked to complete 5 experimental sessions; each 
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session contained 100 pairwise-lottery questions; there were four possible 
outcomes (-£25, £25, £75 and £125), though each lottery contained at 
most three of these four outcomes; subjects were given a show-up fee of 
£25. The pairwise-lotteries were randomly ordered across sessions and 
across subjects. Subjects had to indicate their preferred lottery in each 
pair.  
 
They were told that one of the 500 pairwise-lotteries would be randomly 
selected at the end of the experiment; their preferred lottery on that 
question would be played out; and they would be paid accordingly. We 
have 25,600 observations.  
 
3.3 The econometric method 
We confine the technical detail and the mathematics to an Unpublished 
Appendix available online at the EXEC site. Given the nature of our data 
and our hypotheses, we have to fit preference functionals. Clearly the 
functional has to be non-EU4; the natural choice is Rank Dependent 
Expected Utility (RDEU)5 which now seems to be the most widely accepted 
of all non-EU functions. RDEU involves a weighting function (weighting the 
probabilities); we choose that of Wu and Gonzalez (1996), which seems to 
be generally accepted as being empirically valid. Further, in view of the fact 
that subjects make errors when taking decisions, and in order to fit 
                                                 
4 For otherwise there could be no contamination. 
5 See Wakker (2010), though we should note that he prefers to call it Rank Dependent Utility (or 
even Prospect Theory). 
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preference functionals, we have to assume some stochastic process; here 
we follow Hey (2001) and others in assuming that a normally distributed 
random variable with zero mean is added to the true difference in the 
valuations of the two lotteries in each decision-problem to determine the 
perceived best lottery. We use the constrained maximum-likelihood 
routine in GAUSS to fit the data under the two hypotheses, by estimating 
the parameters for both hypotheses and α for the Contamination 
Hypothesis. In so doing we obtain the maximised log-likelihoods under the 
two hypotheses: LLS and LLC. We can then test whether the Contamination 
Hypothesis fits the data significantly better than the Separation 
Hypothesis. 
 
3.4 Results 
The results can be summarised very quickly in Figure 3.1, which is a 
histogram of the differences between the LLS  and LLC. Using a standard 
likelihood-ratio test, the Contamination Hypothesis fits significantly better 
if (LLC – LLS) is larger than 1.96 (at the 5% level) and 3.32 (at the 1% level). 
The figure shows clearly that there are just 3 subjects in the former 
category and 2 in the latter. Indeed one might even argue that, at these 
levels of significance, such numbers being significant can be expected (5% 
of 53 is 2.65 and 1% of 53 is 0.5), even if the Separation Hypothesis is true. 
The RLI survives this test of its validity. 
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Figure 3.1: the results 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter tests for the existence of a possible form of contamination in 
experiments which use the Random Lottery Incentive mechanism. This 
mechanism is one in which subjects are posed a (large) set of decision 
problems, and where their payment is determined by their decision on a 
randomly chosen one of these problems. Critics have argued that one 
cannot necessarily infer the same things from the resulting data set as one 
could from a data set in which subjects were asked just one question: 
subjects’ responses might be contaminated by their responses on other 
questions. We test here a particularly appealing and cognitively simple 
possible form of contamination: where the subjects’ decision on one 
problem might be directly affected by their decision on the immediately 
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preceding question, and hence indirectly on all preceding questions. 
 
We test this Contamination Hypothesis against the usual Separation 
Hypothesis, and find that for just 3 (2) of the 53 subjects in the experiment, 
the former fits significantly better than the latter at the 5% (1%) level. It 
seems that the subjects do not suffer from this form of contamination. This 
provides further support for the continued use of the Random Lottery 
Incentive mechanism. 
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Appendix A.  
Experimental Instruction for Chapter 1 
These are the instructions given to the subjects in the experiment in 
November 2013. 
 
We have done the experiment twice. One in May 2013 and the other in 
November 2013. The instructions for the two sessions were very similar.  
The only difference between them is the exchange rate of energy 
expenditure and money. In May 2013, one unit of energy expenditure is 
equal to one penny. In November 2013, one unit of energy expenditure is 
equal to 1.5 pence. 
 
We have four treatments in the experiment. Here the instructions are only 
for treatment 1, since the instructions for the four treatments are very 
similar. The differences across treatments are the information quantity and 
quality. 
 
In treatment 1, subjects can see three squares away with ranges 0, 20, 50. 
In treatment 2, subjects can see two squares away with ranges 0, 20. 
In treatment 3, subjects can see three squares away with ranges 0, 40, 100. 
In treatment 4, subjects can see two squares away with ranges 0, 40. 
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Instructions 
(Treatment 1) 
 
You are about to take part in an economics experiment which is designed 
to observe individuals’ decision making processes when they have vague 
information about the future. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition 
to your £2.50 show-up fee, which you cannot lose. You will get paid in cash 
at the end of the experiment. You will fill a demographic survey. This 
survey does NOT affect your payoff.   
 
This is an individual experiment. Please do not communicate with other 
subjects during the experiment. If you have any questions, please let the 
experimenter know and the experimenter will answer them privately.  We 
fear that if you violate this rule we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment.   
 
The Background 
The experiment is based on a story in which you are walking through hilly 
country and it is foggy. You are trying to get to a destination. You know 
where and how far away the destination is. But due to the thick fog, you 
cannot see the terrain around you clearly and hence you cannot 
immediately see the best way to get to your destination. You only have 
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some vague information about the near terrain. Crucially both walking up 
and down hill uses energy – though going down less than going up. Your 
aim is to arrive at the destination with the least expenditure of energy. 
 
The Experiment 
This experiment involves four journeys with four different maps, each of 
which is divided into squares. These maps are modified from different parts 
of the real world. But you do not know which parts they are. In the 
experiment, each map contains 200 by 200 squares. You have to move 
between squares till you reach the destination. The moving rule is that you 
can only move to squares which are share a boundary with your current 
square. In other words, you can only move to the adjacent square up, 
down, left or right relative to your current square. 
 
 
 
As the picture above showed, supposing your current square is the square 
with “Start” on it, you can and only can move to one of the squares with * 
on them. 
 
When you start a journey, you will see a square with “Start” written on it. 
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This is your starting square. You may not see the “Destination” square on 
your screen because sometimes it is too far away and off the screen. But it 
will appear when you get near to it. You can always check the position of 
the destination square relative to your current square from information 
which will be given at the left-top of your screen. When you are moving 
across the terrain, you are always the centre, and the destination is getting 
closer to you (if you are getting closer to it). 
 
On each journey, you click the “Start” button and hence start the journey. 
Then you will see a number on the “Start” square. It is the height of that 
square. As you will notice, for simplicity all heights are expressed as an 
integer. Because the area is hilly, different squares have different heights. 
That means that you may have to move up or down. You have to spend 
energy when moving. At each square you have to decide which square you 
want to move to next. Remember that you can only move to the adjacent 
square up, down, left or right. The software does not allow you to actually 
move to your chosen square until at least 10 seconds have elapsed; this is 
to ensure that you spend some time thinking about your decision. 
 
Because of the fog, you cannot see the heights of other squares clearly. But 
you will be given some information which depends on how far away are 
other squares. If a square is adjacent to (that is, one square away from) the 
square that you are currently on, you will be told its height precisely; if a 
square is two squares away from the square that you are currently on, an 
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interval of width 20 will be specified, and you will be told that the height is 
somewhere in that interval (with all integer heights in the interval equally 
likely); if a square is three squares away from the square that you are 
currently on, an interval of width 50 will be specified, and you will be told 
that the height is somewhere in that interval (with all integer heights in the 
interval equally likely); if a square is more than three squares away from 
the square that you are currently on, you will be told nothing about its 
height. The fog is that thick! 
 
When you move from one square to another, you spend energy. Moving up 
uses more energy than moving down. More precisely, moving up uses 
energy equal to twice the difference between the heights of the two 
squares, while moving down uses energy equal to the difference between 
the heights of the two squares. The software keeps a record of the energy 
you spend in the “expenditure” box on the right-top screen. 
 
You will have an endowment of cash at the beginning of each journey. This 
endowment varies from journey to journey since the maps differ. The 
payoff of any one journey is the endowment on that journey minus the 
energy you spend, where each unit of energy costs 1.5 penny. If your 
expenditure of energy on any journey exceeds your endowment, your 
payoff for that journey will be zero. 
 
We will record the payoff of all four journeys. Your payment for the 
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experiment as a whole will be the payoff on a randomly chosen one of the 
four journeys, plus the showup fee of £2.50. 
 
Examples 
 Your expenditure when you are moving up or down 
You have to spend energy when you are moving up or down. 
Moving-up expenditure is twice the difference between the heights 
of the two squares. Moving-down expenditure is equal to the 
difference between the heights of the two squares. 
 
1. If the height of your current square is 300, and the height of the 
square to which you moving is 400, you are moving up. Your 
energy expenditure is 2(400 – 300) = 200. 
It costs 200 * 1.5= 300 (pence). 
2. If the height of your current square is 400, and the height of the 
square to which you moving is 300, you are moving down. Your 
energy expenditure is (400 - 300) = 100. 
It costs 100 * 1.5=150 (pence). 
        
Control Questions: 
These questions are designed to help you test your understanding of the 
experiment. 
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1. If the height of your current square is 500, and then you move to 
another square with a height of 600, are you moving up or down? And 
how much is your expenditure for this move? 
2. If the height of your current square is 600, and then you move to 
another square with a height of 500, are you moving up or down? And 
how much is your expenditure for this move? 
3. If your payoffs on journeys one to four are £10.25, £12.89, £9.01, £5.33 
and the random process selects journey two as the payoff journey, 
what is your payment from this experiment? (Do remember to include 
the £2.50 show-up fee.) 
Answers: 
 
1. Moving up, because 500 (the height of the current square) is less than 
600 (the height of the next square), the expenditure is 2(600 – 500) 
which is 200. And it costs 200*1.5=300 (pence). 
2. Moving down, because 600 (the height of the current square) is greater 
than 500 (the height of the next square), the expenditure is (600 – 500) 
which is 100. And it costs 100*1.5=150 (pence). 
3. £15.39. 
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Appendix B. 
Experimental Instruction for Chapter 2 
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Instructions 
Preamble 
Welcome to this experiment. These instructions are to help you to 
understand what you are being asked to do during the experiment and 
how you will be paid. The experiment is simple and gives you the chance to 
earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash 
after you have completed the experiment. The payment described below is 
in addition to a participation fee of £2.50 that you will be paid 
independently of your answers. 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment is interested in your preferences under risk. There are no 
right or wrong answers. It is in four parts. Each of the four parts consists of 
a series of problems. At the end of all four parts, one of the four parts will 
be randomly selected, then one of the problems on that part will be 
randomly selected, and then you will play out that problem.  This will 
always imply playing out a lottery. The outcome of playing out this lottery 
will lead to a payoff to you, and we shall pay this to you in cash, plus the 
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participation fee of £2.50, immediately after you have completed the 
experiment. How all this will be done will be explained below.We start by 
describing a generic lottery. Then we describe the four parts; you will not 
necessarily get them in the order that they are described here. 
 
A Generic Lottery 
We describe now what we mean by a ‘Generic Lottery’. Here we represent 
each lottery visually. The visual representation will be one of the following 
two forms. 
 
 
 
 
It is simplest to explain these in terms of the implications for your payment 
if one of these is randomly selected to be played out at the end of the 
experiment. What we will do in all cases is to ask you to draw ‒ without 
looking ‒ a disk out of a bag containing 100 disks numbered from 1 to 100. 
You can check that the bag contains all these disks before you do the 
drawing. The number on the disk that you draw will determine a point on 
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the horizontal axis; your payment would be the amount on the vertical axis 
implied by that point through the figure. So, for example, in the left-hand 
lottery, if the number on the disk that you draw is between 1 and 70 
inclusive you would get £8.75; if it is between 71 and 100 inclusive you 
would get £5.This implies that the chance of you getting paid £8.75 is 0.7 
and the chance of you getting paid £5 is 0.3. This will also be written in 
words. If the right-hand lottery is to be played out, if the number on the 
disk that you draw is between 1 and 30 you would get £5; if it is between 
31 and 70 inclusive you would get between £11 and £15 ‒ the precise 
amount depending upon the number on the disk drawn; if it is between 71 
and 100 inclusive you would get £15. 
 
Let us give specific examples.In the left-hand lottery, suppose the number 
on the disk that you drawis 80, then you would receive £5. In the 
right-hand lottery, suppose the number on the disk that you draw is 50, 
you would receive £13. 
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We now describe the four parts of the experiment. Remember that you 
might not get them in the order presented here. 
 
Part 1: Pairwise Choices 
Here each problem is a simple pairwise choice, an example of which is 
pictured below. In each problem you have to decide which of two lotteries 
you prefer. If this problem on this part is chosen for payment at the end of 
the experiment, then the lottery that you chose will be the one that is 
played out. 
 
In the example below, the left-hand lottery is certain, and the right-hand 
lottery is risky; in some problems both lotteries are risky; in some lotteries 
one of the amounts will be £0 and thus not appear in the figure.  In the 
figure we show the amounts of money you might win on the vertical axis 
and the disk number on the horizontal axis. The implications are written in 
words underneath the figure. So the left-hand lottery would lead to a 
payoff of £10 with certainty; the right-hand lottery would lead to a payoff 
of £15 with chance 0.4 or to a payoff of £0 with chance 0.6; you will be 
asked to click on the lottery that you would prefer to have played out.  
 
In this part you will be asked to express your preference over a total of 80 
such problems. In the upper-right corner of the screen you will be told how 
many problems remain. In each problem, you cannot take a decision until 
at least five seconds have elapsed, but you can take as long as you like.  
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Part 2: Lists 
In some ways this part is similar to Part 1, though here the pairwise choices 
are structured. Each problem is in the form of a list. One such list is shown 
in the figure below. In each list there is a set of pairwise choice problems, 
presented in exactly the same way as in Part 1. But, as you will, see there is 
a pattern: one of the two lotteries in any pair is the same throughout the 
list – here the left-hand lottery is always £15 with chance 0.7 and £0 with 
chance 0.3. The other lottery is changing through the list ‒ in the sense that 
the chance of getting the higher amount of money is increasing, or the 
amount of money is increasing. 
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In this particular list the left-hand lottery is always the same (£15 with 
chance 0.7 and £0 with chance 0.3), while the right-hand lottery is a 
certainty with the amount of money going up from £1.50 to £15 through 
the list. As in Part 1, in each pair you are asked to specify which lottery you 
prefer. You do this by clicking on the preferred lottery; you will see that 
when you do this, the other lottery becomes greyed-out. However, 
because one of the lotteries is getting better through the list, we impose 
some structure on your answers. If you say that you prefer the certainty at 
one point, we force you to say that you also prefer the certainty further 
down the list. You will understand this as you click through the list. When, 
in each pair, one of the lotteries has been indicated as preferred by you 
(and the other in the pair greyed-out) the ‘Confirm’ button will become 
active, allowing you to record your preferences for that list and move onto 
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to the next list.  
 
There are a total of 48 lists in this part of the experiment. In the upper-right 
corner of the screen you will be told how many problems remain. In each 
problem, you cannot take a decision until at least five seconds have 
elapsed, but you can take as long as you like.  
Part 3: Allocations 
In each problem in this part, you will be given a quantity of tokens to 
allocate between two risky colours with stated chances. For each colour 
you will be told the exchange rate between tokens and money. An example 
of such a problem is shown below. 
 
 
 
Here there are100 tokens to allocate; the chance of red happening is 0.7 
and that of yellow 0.3. You have to decide how to allocate the 100 tokens 
between red and yellow; shown is an example of allocation but you may 
prefer a different one. Your chosen allocation implies a lottery – as 
pictured above. If this problem were to be played out at the end of the 
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experiment, this lottery would be played out.  
 
There will be a total of 81 problems in this part. In the upper-right corner of 
the screen you will be told how many problems remain. In each problem, 
you cannot take a decision until at least five seconds have elapsed, but you 
can take as long as you like. 
 
Part 4: Lottery Choices 
In this part, in each problem you will be asked to choose a lottery. The 
choice set is the continuum between two ‘extreme’ lotteries illustrated in 
the figure below: the left-hand lotterycan give any payment between£5 
and £15, with all payments being equally likely; the right-hand lottery 
consists of a simple lottery with two possible outcomes, here £5 with 
chance 0.5 and £15 with chance 0.5. Your chosen lottery can be any 
mixture of these two ‘extreme’ lotteries. As you move the slider bar from 
the extreme left to the extreme right you will see the mixture lottery 
moves from one of the two extremes to the other. The implied payments 
are between £5 and £15, with the chances indicated in the figure. One such 
problem is shown below. 
 
In the example below, if you accept a mixture lottery like this, you would 
be paid £5 with chance of 0.3, £15 with chance of 0.3, and between £11 
and £15 depending on the number on the disk that you randomly draw at 
the end of the experiment.   
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There will be a total of 54 problems in this part. In the upper-right corner of 
the screen you will be told how many problems remain. In each problem, 
you cannot take a decision until at least five seconds have elapsed, but you 
can take as long as you like. 
 
The Payment Procedure 
When you have completed the experiment, one of the experimenters will 
come to you. The experimenter will have a record of your decisions in each 
part of the experiment. You will then be asked to go into an adjoining room 
for payment. There will be another experimenter, who has on their 
computer all the decisions that you took. Then the following procedure will 
be followed. 
 
1. First you will draw ‒ without looking ‒ a disk out of a bag containing 
disks numbered from 1 to 4. The number on the disk will determine 
on which part of the experiment your payment will be determined. 
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2. If the number on the disk is 1, then one of your answers in part 1 
will determine your payment. You will draw ‒ without looking ‒ a 
disk from a bag containing disks numbered from 1 to 80 (the 
number of problems in part 1). This will determine the problem to 
be played out. The experimenter will then retrieve from the 
computer your decision on that problem. This will be a lottery. This 
will then be played out as described above (with you drawing ‒ 
without looking ‒ a disk out of a bag containing numbered disks 
from 1 to 100). 
3. If the number on the disk is 2, then one of your answers in part 2 
will determine your payment. You will draw ‒ without looking ‒ a 
disk from a bag containing disks numbered from 1 to 48 (the 
number of problems in part 2). This will determine the problem to 
be played out. This will be a list. In each list there are 10 pairwise 
choices. You will then draw ‒ without looking ‒ a disk from a bag 
containing disks numbered from 1 to 10. This will determine a 
particular pairwise choice in that list. The experimenter will then 
retrieve from the computer your decision on that pairwise choice. 
This may be a certainty or a lottery. If it is a certainty, you will 
receive that amount of money. It is a lottery it will then be played 
out as described above (with you drawing ‒ without looking ‒ a disk 
out of a bag containing numbered disks from 1 to 100). 
4. If the number on the disk is 3, then one of your answers in part 3 
will determine your payment. You will draw ‒ without looking ‒ a 
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disk from a bag containing disks numbered from 1 to 81 (the 
number of problems in part 3). This will determine the problem to 
be played out. The experimenter will then retrieve from the 
computer your decision on that problem. This will be a lottery. This 
will then be played out as described above (with you drawing ‒ 
without looking ‒ a disk out of a bag containing numbered disks 
from 1 to 100). 
5. If the number on the disk is 4, then one of your answers in part 4 
will determine your payment. You will draw ‒ without looking ‒ a 
disk from a bag containing disks numbered from 1 to 54 (the 
number of problems in part 4). This will determine the problem to 
be played out. The experimenter will then retrieve from the 
computer your decision on that problem. This will be a lottery. This 
will then be played out as described above (with you drawing ‒ 
without looking ‒ a disk out of a bag containing numbered disks 
from 1 to 100). 
 
The show-up fee of £2.50 will be added to the payment as described 
above. You will be paid in cash, be asked to sign a receipt and then you 
are free to go.  
 
If you have any questions, please ask one of the experimenters. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix C.  
  Problem Lists for Chapter 2 
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1. Allocation 
 
ProblemNo Endow ProbX ProbY ExX ExY 
1 100 0.1 0.9 0.5 1 
2 100 0.1 0.9 0.57 1 
3 100 0.1 0.9 0.67 1 
4 100 0.1 0.9 0.8 1 
5 100 0.1 0.9 1 1 
6 100 0.1 0.9 1.25 1 
7 100 0.1 0.9 1.5 1 
8 100 0.1 0.9 1.75 1 
9 100 0.1 0.9 2 1 
10 100 0.2 0.8 0.5 1 
11 100 0.2 0.8 0.57 1 
12 100 0.2 0.8 0.67 1 
13 100 0.2 0.8 0.8 1 
14 100 0.2 0.8 1 1 
15 100 0.2 0.8 1.25 1 
16 100 0.2 0.8 1.5 1 
17 100 0.2 0.8 1.75 1 
18 100 0.2 0.8 2 1 
19 100 0.3 0.7 0.5 1 
20 100 0.3 0.7 0.57 1 
21 100 0.3 0.7 0.67 1 
22 100 0.3 0.7 0.8 1 
23 100 0.3 0.7 1 1 
24 100 0.3 0.7 1.25 1 
25 100 0.3 0.7 1.5 1 
26 100 0.3 0.7 1.75 1 
27 100 0.3 0.7 2 1 
28 100 0.4 0.6 0.5 1 
29 100 0.4 0.6 0.57 1 
30 100 0.4 0.6 0.67 1 
31 100 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
32 100 0.4 0.6 1 1 
33 100 0.4 0.6 1.25 1 
34 100 0.4 0.6 1.5 1 
35 100 0.4 0.6 1.75 1 
36 100 0.4 0.6 2 1 
37 100 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
38 100 0.5 0.5 0.57 1 
39 100 0.5 0.5 0.67 1 
40 100 0.5 0.5 0.8 1 
41 100 0.5 0.5 1 1 
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42 100 0.5 0.5 1.25 1 
43 100 0.5 0.5 1.5 1 
44 100 0.5 0.5 1.75 1 
45 100 0.5 0.5 2 1 
46 100 0.6 0.4 0.5 1 
47 100 0.6 0.4 0.57 1 
48 100 0.6 0.4 0.67 1 
49 100 0.6 0.4 0.8 1 
50 100 0.6 0.4 1 1 
51 100 0.6 0.4 1.25 1 
52 100 0.6 0.4 1.5 1 
53 100 0.6 0.4 1.75 1 
54 100 0.6 0.4 2 1 
55 100 0.7 0.3 0.5 1 
56 100 0.7 0.3 0.57 1 
57 100 0.7 0.3 0.67 1 
58 100 0.7 0.3 0.8 1 
59 100 0.7 0.3 1 1 
60 100 0.7 0.3 1.25 1 
61 100 0.7 0.3 1.5 1 
62 100 0.7 0.3 1.75 1 
63 100 0.7 0.3 2 1 
64 100 0.8 0.2 0.5 1 
65 100 0.8 0.2 0.57 1 
66 100 0.8 0.2 0.67 1 
67 100 0.8 0.2 0.8 1 
68 100 0.8 0.2 1 1 
69 100 0.8 0.2 1.25 1 
70 100 0.8 0.2 1.5 1 
71 100 0.8 0.2 1.75 1 
72 100 0.8 0.2 2 1 
73 100 0.9 0.1 0.5 1 
74 100 0.9 0.1 0.57 1 
75 100 0.9 0.1 0.67 1 
76 100 0.9 0.1 0.8 1 
77 100 0.9 0.1 1 1 
78 100 0.9 0.1 1.25 1 
79 100 0.9 0.1 1.5 1 
80 100 0.9 0.1 1.75 1 
81 100 0.9 0.1 2 1 
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Key: 
ProblemNo: Problem Number 
Endow: the endowment (by tokens) 
ProbX: the probability of red 
ProbY:  the probability of yellow 
ExX:  the exchange rate of red 
ExY:  the exchange rate of yellow 
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2. Lottery Choices 
ProblemNo AmountX ProbX AmountY 
1 0 0.1 5 
2 0 0.2 5 
3 0 0.3 5 
4 0 0.4 5 
5 0 0.5 5 
6 0 0.6 5 
7 0 0.7 5 
8 0 0.8 5 
9 0 0.9 5 
10 0 0.1 10 
11 0 0.2 10 
12 0 0.3 10 
13 0 0.4 10 
14 0 0.5 10 
15 0 0.6 10 
16 0 0.7 10 
17 0 0.8 10 
18 0 0.9 10 
19 0 0.1 15 
20 0 0.2 15 
21 0 0.3 15 
22 0 0.4 15 
23 0 0.5 15 
24 0 0.6 15 
25 0 0.7 15 
26 0 0.8 15 
27 0 0.9 15 
28 5 0.1 10 
29 5 0.2 10 
30 5 0.3 10 
31 5 0.4 10 
32 5 0.5 10 
33 5 0.6 10 
34 5 0.7 10 
35 5 0.8 10 
36 5 0.9 10 
37 5 0.1 15 
38 5 0.2 15 
39 5 0.3 15 
40 5 0.4 15 
41 5 0.5 15 
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42 5 0.6 15 
43 5 0.7 15 
44 5 0.8 15 
45 5 0.9 15 
46 10 0.1 15 
47 10 0.2 15 
48 10 0.3 15 
49 10 0.4 15 
50 10 0.5 15 
51 10 0.6 15 
52 10 0.7 15 
53 10 0.8 15 
54 10 0.9 15 
 
Key: 
ProblemNo: Problem Number 
AmoutX: the first outcome of the lottery 
ProbX:  the probability of the first outcome of the lottery 
AmountY:  the second outcome of the lottery 
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3. Pairwise Choices 
ProblemN
o 
AmountX
L 
ProbX
L 
AmountY
L 
AmoutX
R 
ProbX
R 
AmountY
R 
1 10 0.6 5 10 0.8 0 
2 10 0.4 5 10 0.8 0 
3 10 0.4 5 10 0.6 0 
4 10 0.2 5 10 0.8 0 
5 10 0.2 5 10 0.6 0 
6 10 0.2 5 10 0.4 0 
7 10 0 5 10 0.8 0 
8 10 0 5 10 0.6 0 
9 10 0 5 10 0.4 0 
10 10 0 5 10 0.2 0 
11 5 1 0 10 0.8 0 
12 5 1 0 10 0.6 0 
13 5 1 0 10 0.4 0 
14 5 1 0 10 0.2 0 
15 5 0.8 0 10 0.6 0 
16 5 0.8 0 10 0.4 0 
17 5 0.8 0 10 0.2 0 
18 5 0.6 0 10 0.4 0 
19 5 0.6 0 10 0.2 0 
20 5 0.4 0 10 0.2 0 
21 15 0.6 5 15 0.8 0 
22 15 0.4 5 15 0.8 0 
23 15 0.4 5 15 0.6 0 
24 15 0.2 5 15 0.8 0 
25 15 0.2 5 15 0.6 0 
26 15 0.2 5 15 0.4 0 
27 15 0 5 15 0.8 0 
28 15 0 5 15 0.6 0 
29 15 0 5 15 0.4 0 
30 15 0 5 15 0.2 0 
31 5 1 0 15 0.8 0 
32 5 1 0 15 0.6 0 
33 5 1 0 15 0.4 0 
34 5 1 0 15 0.2 0 
35 5 0.8 0 15 0.6 0 
36 5 0.8 0 15 0.4 0 
37 5 0.8 0 15 0.2 0 
38 5 0.6 0 15 0.4 0 
39 5 0.6 0 15 0.2 0 
40 5 0.4 0 15 0.2 0 
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41 15 0.6 10 15 0.8 0 
42 15 0.4 10 15 0.8 0 
43 15 0.4 10 15 0.6 0 
44 15 0.2 10 15 0.8 0 
45 15 0.2 10 15 0.6 0 
46 15 0.2 10 15 0.4 0 
47 15 0 10 15 0.8 0 
48 15 0 10 15 0.6 0 
49 15 0 10 15 0.4 0 
50 15 0 10 15 0.2 0 
51 10 1 0 15 0.8 0 
52 10 1 0 15 0.6 0 
53 10 1 0 15 0.4 0 
54 10 1 0 15 0.2 0 
55 10 0.8 0 15 0.6 0 
56 10 0.8 0 15 0.4 0 
57 10 0.8 0 15 0.2 0 
58 10 0.6 0 15 0.4 0 
59 10 0.6 0 15 0.2 0 
60 10 0.4 0 15 0.2 0 
61 15 0.6 10 15 0.8 5 
62 15 0.4 10 15 0.8 5 
63 15 0.4 10 15 0.6 5 
64 15 0.2 10 15 0.8 5 
65 15 0.2 10 15 0.6 5 
66 15 0.2 10 15 0.4 5 
67 15 0 10 15 0.8 5 
68 15 0 10 15 0.6 5 
69 15 0 10 15 0.4 5 
70 15 0 10 15 0.2 5 
71 10 1 5 15 0.8 5 
72 10 1 5 15 0.6 5 
73 10 1 5 15 0.4 5 
74 10 1 5 15 0.2 5 
75 10 0.8 5 15 0.6 5 
76 10 0.8 5 15 0.4 5 
77 10 0.8 5 15 0.2 5 
78 10 0.6 5 15 0.4 5 
79 10 0.6 5 15 0.2 5 
80 10 0.4 5 15 0.2 5 
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Key: 
ProblemNo: Problem Number 
AmountXL: the first outcome of the left lottery 
ProbXL: the probability of the first outcome of the left lottery 
AmountYL: the second outcome of the left lottery 
AmountXR: the first outcome of the right lottery 
ProbXR: the probability of the first outcome of the right lottery 
AmountYR: the second outcome of the right lottery  
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4. Holt-Laury Price Lists 
ListNo 
AmountX
L ProbXL 
AmountY
L 
AmountX
R 
ProbX
R 
AmountY
R 
1 5 1 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.9 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.8 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.7 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.6 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.5 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.4 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.3 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.2 0 2.5 1 0 
1 5 0.1 0 2.5 1 0 
              
2 10 1 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.9 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.8 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.7 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.6 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.5 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.4 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.3 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.2 0 5 1 0 
2 10 0.1 0 5 1 0 
              
3 15 1 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.9 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.8 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.7 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.6 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.5 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.4 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.3 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.2 0 7.5 1 0 
3 15 0.1 0 7.5 1 0 
              
4 10 1 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.9 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.8 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.7 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.6 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.5 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.4 5 7.5 1 0 
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4 10 0.3 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.2 5 7.5 1 0 
4 10 0.1 5 7.5 1 0 
              
5 15 1 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.9 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.8 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.7 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.6 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.5 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.4 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.3 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.2 5 10 1 0 
5 15 0.1 5 10 1 0 
              
6 15 1 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.9 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.8 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.7 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.6 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.5 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.4 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.3 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.2 10 12.5 1 0 
6 15 0.1 10 12.5 1 0 
              
7 5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 1 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 1.5 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 2 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 2.5 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 3 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 3.5 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 4 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 4.5 1 0 
7 5 0.5 0 5 1 0 
              
8 10 0.5 0 1 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 2 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 3 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 4 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 5 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 6 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 7 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 8 1 0 
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8 10 0.5 0 9 1 0 
8 10 0.5 0 10 1 0 
              
9 15 0.5 0 1.5 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 3 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 4.5 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 6 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 7.5 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 9 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 10.5 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 12 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 13.5 1 0 
9 15 0.5 0 15 1 0 
              
10 10 0.5 5 5.5 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 6 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 6.5 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 7 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 7.5 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 8 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 8.5 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 9 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 9.5 1 0 
10 10 0.5 5 10 1 0 
              
11 15 0.5 5 6 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 7 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 8 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 9 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 10 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 11 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 12 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 13 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 14 1 0 
11 15 0.5 5 15 1 0 
              
12 15 0.5 10 10.5 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 11 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 11.5 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 12 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 12.5 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 13 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 13.5 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 14 1 0 
12 15 0.5 10 14.5 1 0 
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12 15 0.5 10 15 1 0 
              
13 5 0.2 0 0.5 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 1 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 1.5 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 2 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 2.5 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 3 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 3.5 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 4 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 4.5 1 0 
13 5 0.2 0 5 1 0 
              
14 5 0.3 0 0.5 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 1 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 1.5 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 2 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 2.5 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 3 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 3.5 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 4 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 4.5 1 0 
14 5 0.3 0 5 1 0 
              
15 5 0.4 0 0.5 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 1 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 1.5 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 2 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 2.5 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 3 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 3.5 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 4 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 4.5 1 0 
15 5 0.4 0 5 1 0 
              
16 5 0.6 0 0.5 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 1 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 1.5 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 2 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 2.5 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 3 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 3.5 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 4 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 4.5 1 0 
16 5 0.6 0 5 1 0 
179 
 
              
17 5 0.7 0 0.5 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 1 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 1.5 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 2 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 2.5 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 3 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 3.5 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 4 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 4.5 1 0 
17 5 0.7 0 5 1 0 
              
18 5 0.8 0 0.5 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 1 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 1.5 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 2 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 2.5 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 3 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 3.5 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 4 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 4.5 1 0 
18 5 0.8 0 5 1 0 
              
19 10 0.2 0 1 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 2 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 3 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 4 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 5 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 6 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 7 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 8 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 9 1 0 
19 10 0.2 0 10 1 0 
              
20 10 0.3 0 1 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 2 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 3 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 4 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 5 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 6 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 7 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 8 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 9 1 0 
20 10 0.3 0 10 1 0 
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21 10 0.4 0 1 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 2 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 3 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 4 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 5 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 6 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 7 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 8 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 9 1 0 
21 10 0.4 0 10 1 0 
              
22 10 0.6 0 1 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 2 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 3 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 4 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 5 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 6 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 7 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 8 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 9 1 0 
22 10 0.6 0 10 1 0 
              
23 10 0.7 0 1 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 2 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 3 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 4 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 5 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 6 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 7 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 8 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 9 1 0 
23 10 0.7 0 10 1 0 
              
24 10 0.8 0 1 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 2 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 3 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 4 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 5 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 6 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 7 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 8 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 9 1 0 
24 10 0.8 0 10 1 0 
              
25 15 0.2 0 1.5 1 0 
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25 15 0.2 0 3 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 4.5 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 6 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 7.5 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 9 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 10.5 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 12 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 13.5 1 0 
25 15 0.2 0 15 1 0 
              
26 15 0.3 0 1.5 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 3 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 4.5 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 6 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 7.5 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 9 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 10.5 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 12 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 13.5 1 0 
26 15 0.3 0 15 1 0 
              
27 15 0.4 0 1.5 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 3 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 4.5 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 6 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 7.5 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 9 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 10.5 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 12 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 13.5 1 0 
27 15 0.4 0 15 1 0 
              
28 15 0.6 0 1.5 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 3 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 4.5 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 6 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 7.5 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 9 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 10.5 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 12 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 13.5 1 0 
28 15 0.6 0 15 1 0 
              
29 15 0.7 0 1.5 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 3 1 0 
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29 15 0.7 0 4.5 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 6 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 7.5 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 9 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 10.5 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 12 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 13.5 1 0 
29 15 0.7 0 15 1 0 
              
30 15 0.8 0 1.5 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 3 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 4.5 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 6 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 7.5 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 9 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 10.5 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 12 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 13.5 1 0 
30 15 0.8 0 15 1 0 
              
31 10 0.2 5 5.5 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 6 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 6.5 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 7 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 7.5 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 8 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 8.5 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 9 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 9.5 1 0 
31 10 0.2 5 10 1 0 
              
32 10 0.3 5 5.5 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 6 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 6.5 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 7 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 7.5 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 8 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 8.5 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 9 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 9.5 1 0 
32 10 0.3 5 10 1 0 
              
33 10 0.4 5 5.5 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 6 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 6.5 1 0 
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33 10 0.4 5 7 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 7.5 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 8 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 8.5 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 9 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 9.5 1 0 
33 10 0.4 5 10 1 0 
              
34 10 0.6 5 5.5 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 6 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 6.5 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 7 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 7.5 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 8 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 8.5 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 9 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 9.5 1 0 
34 10 0.6 5 10 1 0 
              
35 10 0.7 5 5.5 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 6 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 6.5 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 7 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 7.5 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 8 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 8.5 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 9 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 9.5 1 0 
35 10 0.7 5 10 1 0 
              
36 10 0.8 5 5.5 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 6 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 6.5 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 7 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 7.5 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 8 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 8.5 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 9 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 9.5 1 0 
36 10 0.8 5 10 1 0 
              
37 15 0.2 5 6 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 7 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 8 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 9 1 0 
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37 15 0.2 5 10 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 11 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 12 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 13 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 14 1 0 
37 15 0.2 5 15 1 0 
              
38 15 0.3 5 6 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 7 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 8 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 9 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 10 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 11 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 12 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 13 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 14 1 0 
38 15 0.3 5 15 1 0 
              
39 15 0.4 5 6 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 7 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 8 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 9 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 10 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 11 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 12 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 13 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 14 1 0 
39 15 0.4 5 15 1 0 
              
40 15 0.6 5 6 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 7 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 8 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 9 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 10 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 11 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 12 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 13 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 14 1 0 
40 15 0.6 5 15 1 0 
              
41 15 0.7 5 6 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 7 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 8 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 9 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 10 1 0 
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41 15 0.7 5 11 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 12 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 13 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 14 1 0 
41 15 0.7 5 15 1 0 
              
42 15 0.8 5 6 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 7 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 8 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 9 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 10 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 11 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 12 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 13 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 14 1 0 
42 15 0.8 5 15 1 0 
              
43 15 0.2 10 10.5 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 11 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 11.5 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 12 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 12.5 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 13 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 13.5 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 14 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 14.5 1 0 
43 15 0.2 10 15 1 0 
              
44 15 0.3 10 10.5 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 11 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 11.5 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 12 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 12.5 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 13 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 13.5 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 14 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 14.5 1 0 
44 15 0.3 10 15 1 0 
              
45 15 0.4 10 10.5 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 11 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 11.5 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 12 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 12.5 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 13 1 0 
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45 15 0.4 10 13.5 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 14 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 14.5 1 0 
45 15 0.4 10 15 1 0 
              
46 15 0.6 10 10.5 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 11 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 11.5 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 12 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 12.5 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 13 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 13.5 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 14 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 14.5 1 0 
46 15 0.6 10 15 1 0 
              
47 15 0.7 10 10.5 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 11 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 11.5 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 12 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 12.5 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 13 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 13.5 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 14 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 14.5 1 0 
47 15 0.7 10 15 1 0 
              
48 15 0.8 10 10.5 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 11 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 11.5 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 12 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 12.5 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 13 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 13.5 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 14 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 14.5 1 0 
48 15 0.8 10 15 1 0 
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Key: 
ListNo: List Number 
AmountXL: the first outcome of the left lottery 
ProbXL: the probability of the first outcome of the left lottery 
AmountYL: the second outcome of the left lottery 
AmountXR: the first outcome of the right lottery 
ProbXR: the probability of the first outcome of the right lottery 
AmountYR: the second outcome of the right lottery 
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Appendix D.  
Estimates of Parameters in Chapter 2  
(Full Set, without Outliers) 
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Figure D.1: Estimates of r Using AL across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.2: Estimates of r Using LC across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.3: Estimates of r Using PC across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.4: Estimates of r Using HL across Preference Functionals 
 
  
193 
 
Figure D.5: Estimates of s Using AL across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.6: Estimates of s Using LC across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.7: Estimates of s Using PC across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.8: Estimates of s Using HL across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.9: Estimates of g across Preference Functionals 
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Figure D.10: Estimates of r in RREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.11: Estimates of r in RRRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.12: Estimates of r in AREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.13: Estimates of r in ARRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.14: Estimates of s in RREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.15: Estimates of s in RRRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.16: Estimates of s in AREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.17: Estimates of s in ARRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.18: Estimates of g in RRRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure D.19: Estimates of g in ARRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Appendix E. 
  Estimates of Parameters in Chapter 2  
              (Full Set, with Outliers) 
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Figure E.1: Estimates of r Using AL across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.2: Estimates of r Using LC across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.3: Estimates of r Using PC across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.4: Estimates of r Using HL across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.5: Estimates of s Using AL across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.6: Estimates of s Using LC across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.7: Estimates of s Using PC across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.8: Estimates of s Using HL across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
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Figure E.9: Estimates of g across Preference Functionals (with Outliers) 
 
  
218 
 
Figure E.10: Estimates of r in RREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.11: Estimates of r in RRRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.12: Estimates of r in AREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.13: Estimates of r in ARRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.14: Estimates of s in RREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.15: Estimates of s in RRRD across Elicitation Methods 
 
  
  
224 
 
Figure E.16: Estimates of s in AREU across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.17: Estimates of s in ARRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.18: Estimates of g in RRRD across Elicitation Methods 
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Figure E.19: Estimates of g in ARRD across Elicitation Methods 
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